

BRANDENBURG AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF 1688

INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION

ZUR ERLANGUNG DER

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
VON

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ABBREVIATIONS

B. St. A.	Königliches Geheimes Staatsarchiv in Berlin.
H. R. A.	Algemeen Rijksarchief in the Hague.
K. H. A.	Koninklijk Huisarchief in the Hague.
L. R. O.	Public Record Office in London.
Avaux	Avaux, <i>Négotiations en Hollande.</i>
Cavelli	Campana de Cavelli, <i>Les derniers Stuarts à St. Germain-en-Laye.</i>
Dalrymple	Sir John Dalrymple, <i>Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland.</i>
Haake	P. Haake, <i>Brandenburgische Politik und Kriegführung.</i>
Müller	P. L. Müller, <i>Wilhelm III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck.</i>



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The treaties of the years 1678 and 1679, which together form the Peace of Nymegen, placed a period to the second European war of Louis XIV, and left him, for a time, all but dictator in Europe. The old alliances against France were shattered; and several years intervened before the new system grew dangerous. Even then their proper development hung by slender threads, until after the actual outbreak of hostilities. Only two points were certain; the ambitions of Louis must, sooner or later, bring on further warfare, and William of Orange would be a leader among his opponents. He, in spite of all the incidents and results of his career, seems often to stand for opposition to Louis, and for little else. This is true both politically and personally, and may be explained, in part, by his clear reading of the European situation, combined with the fact that he had no heirs of his body. With this exception there was hardly a prince, or state, whose position at any future time could be definitely counted upon. The Emperor was absorbed in his Turkish conquests. The experience, gained during a reign of constant danger and poverty, hardly saved Frederick William from being carried away on the wings of his vision, the vision of the Prussia which Frederick the Great was to use. Denmark and Sweden, Wittelsbach, Wettin, Welf, and Stewart, all had their separate ambitions. All were under the immediate influence of the example of Louis XIV, and it was probably a very old, or very weak ruler, who did not dream of following some little distance along a like road. Alliances and cross alliances were numerous, for there were many powers, large and small, waxing and waning, each with more or less definite plans and hopes. Each knew that the

struggle must break out again, but not where the balance of interests would lead them. In the midst of the resulting tangle of treaties, negotiations, and quarrels, Brandenburg was peculiarly in a position to exercise decisive influence.

Humanly speaking, two things seemed necessary if the allies of the coming war were to be sufficiently formidable. In the first place England must be brought actively into opposition to France. Because of the great question of power at sea, and in order to remove from the Netherlands the fear of another 1672,¹ even a neutral England was practically an ally of Louis XIV. Here is the one success on which William felt obliged to count. Secondly, as this came more and more certainly to mean the expedition of 1688, the attitude of Brandenburg became directly important. Not only had she been the most vital ally of Louis, but she alone could offer the desired support which would enable Orange to go to England. Of course, ultimately, the Emperor must be drawn again to the West, and the German Princes, with Spain and Savoy, must, in so far as possible, be brought into the league.²

This naked analysis does not mean to ignore the real complexity of the situation, but merely to emphasize the essential nature of the relations between the Elector and Orange. Especially it would not forget either that William's most necessary support was from the Netherlands and the revolutionists in England, or that the real reading of the situation, the "*nunc aut numquam*", remained with him. It was in a very real sense his battle; but, just because the basic position of Orange was no more in doubt than that of Louis himself, the decision of the Elector became decisive in shaping definite plans. It is, for instance, of no importance that the expedi-

¹ Pufendorf "*De rebus gestis Friderici III.*," Lib. I § 70.

² There is also a reason, for making Brandenburg the center of the story, in the fact that the relations with Orange and the Provinces are really the central feature of the Brandenburg policy during the period, while the relations with Brandenburg are but one portion of the policy of Orange.

tion may have been suggested by him, for it could not have been foreign to William's mind, the real point being that the Elector is now ready to talk about it.

This readiness can surely be dated as early as 1685. To date it earlier is merely to say that the French alliance was never more than a passing phase. The last noticable event of 1684 had been the establishment of the Twenty Years Truce, on a basis which appeared to promise Louis the foundation of a permanent preponderance. The alliance between France and Brandenburg seemed strong, and there were grounds for hope of drawing the House of Brunswick into the French system. The association of 1681, between the Emperor, Spain, Sweden, and the United Provinces had shown no signs of vigor. The alliance of 1682 had yet to reach the meager stature of the Augsburg Alliance. But in 1685 the change is evident. The offensive of Louis, both political and religious, had reached a new and more unbearable stage. His real hope of effective alliance in Germany grew less. In England James soon entered the road towards the Revolution. Protestantism seemed in greater danger than since the death of Wallenstein. All this the Elector felt, and was in addition convinced that subsidies were the only positive gain to be drawn from the French alliance. Thus came his last great change of front, marked outwardly by his several quarrels with France, and his closer relations with the United Provinces and with the Emperor.

Nor is his ensuing uncertainty by any means as great as at times appears. Of his final policy he was no longer in doubt, but there were reasons for appearing doubtful, among them the hope of securing as many French subsidy payments as possible. But there was also the danger of a premature break with France, and the fact that he could do much to hold her in diplomatic play. As to details he could not be certain. He may, for instance, have expected the war to break out earlier. When he seems more impatient than his nephew, it may be because, partly owing to inferior information, he felt that

the danger to English Protestantism was too real to allow of much delay. It may be that, fearing his son's weakness, he hoped to reap success before his own strength failed. But this should not be confused with uncertainty as to his main position.

Certainly the Elector appears, in one way or another, the central point in much of the most important business of these years. Not that the new system developed without interruption. No stratification of treaties could calm all the quarrels which might arise. Frederick Wilhelm, particularly, found himself in frequent difficulties with each of his neighbors.¹ The delicacy of the task of securing both Sweden and Denmark to the alliance is an example of the numerous diplomatic complications. Still the development, tho gradual and irregular, was definite. The part played by Frederick William, and the importance of the relations with William and the Provinces, are constantly noticeable. It was the Elector who made large, if ill considered, sacrifices in the hope of drawing the Hapsburg power more speedily to the West. He played no inconsiderable part in holding the northern situation in check. He thwarted, where possible, the negotiations with the House of Brunswick. He probably did something to counteract the attempts, of Avaux and others, to increase the friction between Orange and his opponents at home. If he still had many dreams, the plan against France, for both political and personal reasons, holds the foreground. To this end his concert with the Netherlands and William was above all imperative.

For some years these relations had seemed to signify very little. Then, at the end of 1684, Diest proposed an alliance in the name of Brandenburg. The Estates refused his advances, at least in public, tho the mission of Spaen in the

¹ Compare Rebenac, in *Urkunden und Akten*, XX, p. 1092, "C'est, Sire, le genie naturel de cette cour d'etablir des pretentions sur toutes les choses du monde, de les croire toutes justes, et de les faire valoir selon sa puissance."

Provinces followed so shortly that the refusal cannot have carried much weight. Early in 1685 Gaultier appeared at the electoral court as a special agent of Orange.¹ Fuchs, during the summer, negotiated, at the Hague, a new treaty which, in spite of continued disputes on commercial questions, laid the foundations of real alliance, and would have made Brandenburg useless to France in any probable emergency. In the following months Diest usually remained in the Netherlands, carrying on the regular diplomatic business and furnishing news, with special attention to English affairs. Much of his information came from leaders of the Orange party and formed a valuable, tho possibly a partisan, supplement to the reports of Bonnet from London. The Provinces had an agent of inferior diplomatic rank, but of good ability, at Berlin. Possible negotiations, looking more directly to the plan of 1688, were so largely oral and secret that few traces remain. Toward the end of 1685 Spaen again visited the Hague, and did not confine himself to his ostensible mission of securing a loan to be expended on the fortifications of Wesel.² What discussions actually occurred does not, however, appear.

The chief regular business of 1686, aside from Frederick

¹ Frederick William to William, March 23, 1685: "Was Ew. Lbd. mir durch—Gaultier hinterbringen lassen wollen, solches habe von demselben bey verschiedenen geheimbten audientien—vernommen. Gleichwie ich nuhn nicht ermangelt ein so wichtiges werk reiflich zu überlegen, also habe die noth erachtet mit Ew. Lbd. fernerweith daraus in vertrauen communiciren zu lassen. Und weil ich ohne dem entschlossen bin—Fuchs—abzuschicken, also werde demselben unter anderen auch hierauf instruiren." Draft in B. St. A.

² William to Frederick William, March 1, 1686: "J'ay bien recu les lettres que V. A. E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'crire par Mr. le Baron de Spaen sur quoy je l'ay entretenu longtemps dont il aura sans doute informe V. A. E., et de mes sentiments sur la conjuncture presente, mais comme il est necessaire qu'elle en soit informee plus particulièrement j'espere de le pouvoir faire en peu de jours, comme ainsi sur ce qu'elle desire de savoir au regardt de Angleterre." Copy in K. H. A.

William's vain attempt to hasten peace with the Turk, was the inclusion of Brandenburg in the Netherlands-Swedish alliance. The Elector took evident interest in English developments at this time, and, probably with them in mind, agreed to the interview at Cleves which took place in July. Orange may have suggested the meeting thru Baron von Heyden,¹ who visited Berlin in April; tho it is also to be noted that Leven,² in recounting his services, lays the chief emphasis on a mission to Berlin, thru which he persuaded Frederick William to go to Cleves.³ Tho Amerongen appeared there with the compliments of the Estates, the relations of the princes are of first interest. The fact that Schomberg was not present can hardly be held to reduce the entire matter to the realms of mere speculation. The whole course of events, before and after, shows clearly enough what must have been the chief subjects, about which they would desire to converse. Furthermore the conversation between William and Fridag, and Rebenac's report of the careful treatment which he received, bring each

¹ William to Frederick William, May 11, 1686, "Je ne puis asses temoigne ma recognoissance a V. A. E. du bon accueil qu'elle a fait au Baron de Heyden. Et de ce qu'elle a bien voulu prendre de si bonnes resolutions sur ce qu'elle a l'honneur de luy représenter de ma part." Copy in K. H. A.

² David Mellville, third Earl of Leven, 1660-1728, accompanied his father to Holland after the Rye House plot. He entered the Brandenburg military service in 1685, and acted at various times as agent between Berlin and the Hague. He later raised the regiment with which he accompanied Orange to England.

³ "I must begin at the time I had the honour to be known to Your Lordship at the court of Brandenburg. I had the honour to be employed by the Prince of Orange—to negotiate his interest at that court privately, and was so happy as to be the instrument of persuading his Electoral Highness to make his journey to Cleves, to have an interview with the Prince of Orange, in order to concert measures for undertaking the Revolution, which was the foundation thereof. Thereafter I made several journeys from Berlin to the Hague with private commissions upon the same account, until that matter was ripe." Leven and Mellville Papers, p. XLVI.

some indirect confirmation. It is unfortunate that the activity of Avaux, and other accomplished spies, made secrecy so essential. But the very lack of direct information about a meeting, considered so important, is in itself further evidence that they discussed the religious and political peril, the necessity of bringing England and the Empire into the common plan, and the need of postponing action. In addition the Orange inheritance and some minor matters, such as the condition of the Piedmontese Protestants,¹ surely received attention.

As evidence of some special interest in the bearing and possibilities of the English situation stand Pufendorf's account, and Leven's statement. Then there is the fact that the idea could not have been foreign to either of their minds, and that neither ever seriously considered the possibility of using James by diplomatic means, at least after 1685. The agents of Orange in England were chiefly occupied in correspondence with the King's enemies, while Bonnet was little more than a careful reporter of news. They may have hoped for a peaceful inheritance before the new conflict; but, lacking this, they must have had in mind the invasion. Still the time had not come for definite agreements and, if there had been anything of the kind, some reference would have appeared later.

These interviews fail to smooth matters entirely. The difficulties between the Dutch West India Company and the Brandenburg African Company continue. As late as March, 1688, Rebenac reports that Fuchs, tho in very poor health, had himself carried to Potsdam to calm the Elector, who had become enraged over new Dutch aggressions.² These questions, however, decrease in importance in proportion to the need of association.

¹ This was discussed with Amerongen. Compare his report from Cleves, July 27, 1686. H. R. A.

² This report of Rebenac, March 23, may be somewhat exaggerated, but it illustrates the importance of Fuchs.

Thru 1687 the danger and rumors of danger increase,¹ but the web of negotiation and intrigue during the last months of the Great Elector's life lacks detail. The mission of Hop² very likely had other aims than the mere arbitration of differences with Denmark.³ Tho his reports are largely in general terms, some suggestion of things below the surface may be seen, among them a proposition for the union of the Dutch and Brandenburg fleets.⁴ A letter, carried by Leven, from Schomberg to Sidney falls in October.⁵ Undoubtedly Leven had other communications to make, and Schomberg other letters to write.⁶ In November Pettekum arrived as agent of Orange, after the latter, according to Avaux, had decided it impossible to go to Berlin himself. In February Leven returned to represent both Orange and the Revolutionists to the Elector and his heir.⁷ The drawing of Danklemann into these interviews strongly implies some earlier relations also between him and Orange. In March, Spaen made one of his several journeys to the Hague,⁸ perhaps expecting now to plan very definitely for the summer. The entire want of concealment may be a witness to the truth of the Elector's claim that Spaen had no mission from him in Holland.⁹ It may testify to his

¹ See, for instance, *Urkunden und Akten*, XXV, 1366.

² *Urkunden und Akten*, III, 781 ff.

³ Report of Rebenac in *Urkunden und Akten*, XX, 1246.

⁴ This seems to have gone no further. The gain would not have made up for the resulting demands and friction.

⁵ Sidney to William, June 20/30, 1688. *Sidney Diary*, II, 269.

⁶ *Sidney Diary*, II, 267.

⁷ Pufendorf, "Res gestae Friderici III," *Lib. I*, § 68. "Res gestae Friderici Wilhelmi Magni," *Lib. XIX*, § 99.

⁸ Spanheim to Frederick William, March 17/27, "que ce n'est pas la premiere fois que les courses à la Haye du General Spaen avoient cause, quoy que sans aucun fondement de pareils ombrages." B. St. A.

⁹ Frederick William to Spanheim, Mar. 27-April 6, "So viele aber die allianz mit dem Printz von Oranien wie auch die 9000 man so wir nach dem Rhein marchiren lassen—da habt ihr dem Marquis de Croissy zu contestiren das wir an alle diese dinge nie im aller geringsten

belief in the near approach of the conflict. Considering the political situation and the known inclinations of the two princes, it seems almost incredible that some such mission was not taking place. But only Avaux gives hint of success on the part of Spaen, and even he does not suggest that Brandenburg intended to surrender any troops to the service of the Provinces. A relation from Spanheim implies that even Paris soon decided the story to be "une pure chimere." Avaux says that Spaen "avait fait un accord avec le Prince d'Orange par lequel en vertu du Traite fait il y a trois ans entre l'Electeur de Brandebourg et cet Etat—il est convenu que l'Electeur enverroient dans le Duché de Cleves neuf milles hommes pour la sureté du bas Rhin." Certainly to reassure the Netherlands it would require something more than this placing, on their borders, of an army still allied with France. Whether there is here a failure to agree or not, Rebenac, in his final report from Berlin,¹ still places great emphasis on the solidity of the relations with the Netherlands, at least while the old Elector lives. And the number of missions, of which traces remain, show that the lack of regular correspondence was supplemented by sufficient special communication.

Meanwhile England was also preparing for 1688. What might have happened if the development and culmination, in England and upon the Continent, had been less simultaneous, is a fruitful subject for speculation. Fortunately the policies of James, the readiness of the revolutionists, and the fears of Amsterdam,² came to a head in the same months. William, thru his English correspondents, Dutch agents in England, and Englishmen of many minds in the Netherlands, had kept constantly informed as to the changes. At first he very likely

gedacht, viel weniger dergleichen concertiret hetten."

Compare with the secrecy observed in Leven's mission, that of Görtz to Vienna, and the Fuchs-Bentinck meeting in August.

¹ *Revue Historique*, Jan., 1902.

² They were roused by the tales of the refugees, the danger of union between France and England, and between France and Cologne.

hoped for good relations with James and a peaceful succession.¹ But he did not, in any case, intend to be hurried into premature hostilities, either by French agents or his allies. He had no intention of adding his name to the list of unsuccessful adventurers for the throne of England. This was no mere episode of personal history, but the keystone in the political struggle which he so largely personified. It must be undertaken on as certain a basis as he could devise.

James, on the other hand, had blindly driven matters from bad to worse at home; while unfortunate complications gave rise to belief in his close alliance with France, and an ambition to crush the United Provinces.² Thruout 1687 diplomatists everywhere prophesied war between them and England.³ Finally political pamphlets, the possibility of the birth of an heir, the demand for the return of the regiments from the Dutch service, the exercise of the right of search, the second Declaration of Indulgence, bring matters, in the Spring of 1688, to the point where William could be reasonably certain of the support of the Estates.⁴ While Hoffmann is writing,⁵ from London, that James can not possibly prepare for war, the King himself continues his provocations, and Avaux reports active preparations in the Netherlands.⁶

At the same time Louis is waking to a new offensive. The success of the Emperor against the Turk, the activity of

¹ The correspondence given by Dalrymple, for 1685, certainly leaves this impression.

² This belief increases during the Summer, owing to James' interference in behalf of Furstenburg.

³ Avaux, Jan. 13 and Jan. 25.

Rebenac to Louis, July 17, 1687.

⁴ Cavelli, II, *passim*. Reports of Diest are full on these questions.

On Mar. 4, 1688, Diest writes, "Es hetten S'r May't von England dess Princen von Oraniens Ho't keine grossere dienst thun undt ihn besser mit der Stadt Amsterdam undt andere Republicquains reconciliren können, alss durch diese conduite." B. St. A.

⁵ Cavelli, II, 170.

⁶ Avaux, VI, pp. 136, 147, 149.

William and Brandenburg, the question of the Cologne election, and the Palatinate inheritance, all lead him to believe that a settlement must not be delayed. Surely conditions seemed favorable. No ready alliance opposed him. He was not the dupe of Frederick William, but felt that he might still use the latter's desire for peace and subsidies, and may have founded even greater hope upon Frederick's supposed avarice and fears.¹ He had also the alliance with Hanover, and with Denmark, naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, and thought to control Cologne. As to England, if he could bring James into his system, well and good; if not, he could still make him useful in occupying Orange. He intended that the latter should force James into his arms on one side, while French armies conquered peace with the Hapsburg on the other. But he failed utterly to estimate the outcome of this expedition to England, which he allowed thru directing his first attack against the Empire, rather than against Holland.

Thus, in the spring of 1688, Europe faced a crisis which the death of the Great Elector did not postpone. There can be little doubt that even the allies were relieved as to their prospects, while Louis hoped to deal anew with his successor. The relations between men like Orange and Frederick William could never be entirely smooth. Neither was of the type to surrender independence or leadership. Rebenac says of the attitude of the latter, "*Le Prince d'Orange est neveu de Monsieur l'Electeur, mais la consideration qu'on a pour lui augmente et diminue de temps a autre.*"² Avaux reports that William was now much more hopeful of success, especially in negotiating with the House of Brunswick.³ Burnet writes: "I told him that if the old elector of Brandenburg should happen to die I believed they might depend upon the prince

¹ Relying on Rebenac's reports and the promises of Schöning and of Frederick. Compare Rebenac to Louis, April 19, 1687, and April 6, 1688, Rebenac's final report, and Poussin to Croissy, May 4, 1688.

² Rebenac's final report, *Revue Historique*, Jan., 1902.

³ Avaux, VI, p. 188.

being able to come over by the end of the year, but if he should happen to languish long I should scarce hope that the thing could be performed.”¹ And it may well be that the expedition could hardly have been accomplished under the old Elector. William could go to England, tho Frederick continued his diplomatic intercourse with France, because the Provinces had so considerable a body of Brandenburg troops in their own service. But that he could have gone, while Frederick William kept the protecting force under his own orders and was still in alliance with France; or that Frederick William would either have given up the control of his troops or the hope of the French subsidies, all seem doubtful. In addition much distrust and friction were now removed which would have made difficult the completion of agreements with the other North German powers.²

Frederick III was at once faced by the great question of his attitude towards France and William, and by a number of other problems of not inconsiderable importance. He was never, like William, the man of a single all powerful idea. But he had accepted, at least in its main outlines the view of the European situation, held by Orange and the Great Elector, by Waldeck, Fagel, Schomberg, and Fuchs; and he played his part. Indeed, during the first months of his rule, he nearly always turned his real attention to the alliance with William and the curbing of France. This is the positive side of his policy. Here he acts, while in dealing with France he never goes beyond words. The one course is positive, offensive, active, growing. The other is essentially negative, defensive and tentative. Even as regards subsidy payments, tho he hoped for some results from Rebenac's good offices, it does not seem that he had, or could have thought to have,

¹ Original memoirs of Burnet, in Foxcraft, "Supplement to Burnet," p. 289.

² Müller, Vol. II, p. 29, gives a brief description of the attitude of Waldeck at this point.

any real expectations from France after July. The development is not always clear, especially before October. It is still, at times, the case that existing papers give only the hint that something was under way.

Diest should be able to throw important light on many points. He was an agent of long standing, a trusted agent, carrying on business of consequence at the Hague. In so far as he dealt with the Estates little direct information about the plan of Orange could be expected. But he was a careful observer, in close touch with conditions in England and the Netherlands, and in constant intercourse with William and the leaders of his party. Among his reports are thirty-four communications, dated between January 1, and May 10, 1688, of which fourteen are postscripts without letters of the same date. Of twenty-six communications, between May 10, and August 27,¹ sixteen are postscripts without accompanying letters. The two reports, not postscripts, during May and June,² contain references to interviews with Orange regarding special commissions, the nature of which is not discussed. It seems thus easy of belief that, at least in these months, Diest was important, so much so that the more valuable portion of his correspondence was kept apart. There is also to be noted the break in his reports, during his visit to Berlin in the critical month of September. The drafts of most of his instructions, beginning with September 23, are at hand. Before that date there are but five, for 1688, of which three deal with personal matters, one with the Orange inheritance, and one with the treaty of June 20/30.

Frederick's previous relation to the plan of 1688 is not beyond question, tho it is credible that his knowledge of it, in some form, goes back many months. The terms of the letter,³

¹ This is the last report before Oct. 15.

² May 15/25, and June 4/May 25.

³ Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, William and Mary, Vol. I, p. 10. Feb. 27, 1689.

congratulating William on "the completion of the wishes which some years ago I had formed," need not imply any knowledge of the actual plan. But previous correspondence gives, here and there, a hint of something beyond mere compliments, felicitation, and condolence. As early as May, 1686, there occurred a somewhat special exchange of courtesies¹; and, tho they outwardly betoken nothing more, it may be noted that, since this is the time of Frederick's secret agreement with the Emperor, he might naturally also be looking toward William. In August, the latter writes in terms of deep disappointment that Frederick did not appear at Cleves.² In 1687, having received word that he was opposed to Schomberg's employment by the Great Elector, Orange sent him a letter by Hompesche, whose ostensible mission was condolence on the death of the Margrave Ludwig. William assures him "*Votre Altesse en pourra tirer de tres bons services, j'ay cru estre oblige de luy dire cecy puis qu'elle pouroit avoir d'autre information, et comme je croi ne me pas tromber en l'assurant que cette affaire luy est tres avantageuse aussi bien qu'au publique, j'espere qu'elle l'approuvera entierement, sur quoy je pourrois luy dire bien des choses si j'aurois me fier au papier.*"³ Here Frederick appears hardly informed upon each passing detail, but certainly not unacquainted with the situation. In January, 1688, to the usual compliments, Frederick added that upon other matters, including the subject of France, Pettekum would report his views.⁴ William's unreserved recommendation⁵ of Leven was answered, so far as writing is concerned, by general but complete assurances.⁶ Even if Lewius, whose

¹ At the time Baron de Heyden was in Berlin. William to Frederick, May 11, 1686.

² William to Frederick, Aug. 17, 1686. B. St. A.

³ William to Frederick, May 5, 1687. B. St. A.

⁴ Frederick to William, Jan. 7, 1688. Concept in B. St. A.

⁵ Feb. 28, 1688. B. St. A.

⁶ Frederick to William, Mar. 28, 1688. B. St. A. "Mr. le Comte de Leven m'ayant rendu la lettre que V. A. m'a ecrite en sa faveur, je

secret journey to Berlin Pufendorf mentions,¹ is not to be identified with Leven, his mission could hardly have had the abrupt importance Pufendorf assigned to it, for it would not have been undertaken without considerable previous searching of the minds of both Frederick and Dankleemann. If the two names refer, as seems likely, to the same individual, it is noteworthy that Leven himself makes no separate mention of this affair. Since Orange dealt with Frederick directly, the Elector would know little, if anything, of their relations. And it may easily be that the weight, in Pufendorf's story, should have been placed rather on the understanding between the two Brandenburg princes. In any case the details are lacking, for the vital portion of the correspondence was clearly oral.

Officially to express condolence and congratulation, William sent Bentinck, as a man to whom Frederick could speak with absolute freedom.² He must have had opportunity for several personal interviews, during his two weeks stay at the court of the new Elector. Tho it has been suggested that the latter made no promises at this time, wishing first to learn

me suis tellement explique envers luy sur son sujet et sur tout ce qu'il m'a dit que je scay que V. A. en sera satisfaite. Et comme il luy en a fait rapport auquel V. A. se peut fier je n'y ajouterais rien—."

¹ "Accedebat dehinc sub finem Januarii huius anni ad Electorem missus e proceribus Scotiae Levvius, qui ostendebat, ut Angliae proceres liberationem suam accelerari urgeant, ac jam tempus monere judicent, ut manus rei admoveatur. Idem et jussu Arausionensis Friderico Principi Electorali, ac soli Eberhardo Dankelmanno id secretum communicabant, in cuius conscientiam nemo tota aula tunc admissus fuit." *Res gestae Friderici Wilhelmi*, Lib. XIX, § 99.

² William to Frederick, May, 1688. B. St. A. "Je lui envoye Mr. de Bentinck mon Chamberlan, lequel je luy prie de l'ecoutes favorablement, et de luy donner une entiere creance en ce qu'il aura que cette une personne a qui je me fie entierement, et auquel V. A. E. l'honneur de représenter de ma par a V. A. E. je l'ay choisi expres puis se peut ouvrir sans aucun scruple comme a moy mesme."

the decision of his neighbors,¹ it would seem that promises in some form, are implied.² They cannot, however, have been detailed, nor would they prove any real intention of acting without the other princes. William at least satisfied himself that Frederick could be counted upon, if matters developed favorably. Within the next few weeks they were rapidly carried beyond such unwritten words, partly thru three fruitful events: the death of Maximilian Henry of Cologne, the birth of a son to James, the Invitation of the Seven.

Tho the birth of an heir to the throne of England decided nothing, it had a real effect on many minds. Incidentally it gave opportunity for a partial showing of opinion, when the agents of Spain, Brandenburg, Celle, and Hanover refused to attend the celebration given by Albeville³ in honor of the event. The death of the Archbishop brought the danger at Cologne to a head,⁴ and also increased the suspicion of an alliance between Louis and James,⁵ thus turning Pope and Emperor to William, and emphasizing the rift in the Catholic camp. The Invitation of the Seven came as the formal sign of readiness in England, and was followed by less formal invitations and promises of support thru the summer and autumn.⁶

In June Hop, who had returned from Hamburg to Berlin immediately after the death of Frederick William,⁷ negotiated the renewal of the treaties of 1678 and 1685, between Brandenburg and the Provinces. He had, in accordance with

¹ Haake, p. 29.

² Compare the instructions for Fuchs, July 21/31, "Er hat dabei zu contestiren dass wir uns erinnerten wass wir deshalb bey seiner anwesenheit versprochen." Ranke, Werke, XXI, p. 307.

³ English agent at the Hague. Compare Avaux, VI, p. 240. Similar was the situation at Regensburg.

⁴ Fear of a new 1672. Wagenaar, *Vaderlandsche Historie*, LX § IX.

⁵ Pufendorf, *De rebus gestis Friderici III*, p. 15.

⁶ Dalrymple, Part I, Bk. V, App.

⁷ Report of Hop, May 9/19, 1688. H. R. A.

instructions dated June 9, made propositions in this direction; and Frederick appointed Meinders, Fuchs and Danklemann to undertake the matter. In two sessions, June 26 and June 29, they agreed without difficulty on the form of renewal suggested by Hop.¹ A noticeable feature is the ease and comparative speed with which the business was carried thru.² The same is true of the Fuchs-Bentinck meeting, but differs markedly from the course of diplomacy with France, Denmark, Poland, or the House of Brunswick. Nevertheless this renewal of June 20/30 was not ratified, since Frederick made the adjustment of various long-standing claims a prerequisite. He insisted upon this in the conferences at Berlin³ and in the notification and instructions sent to Diest.⁴ As far as can be judged Diest took up the old negotiation with the support of Orange, and with some new hope of success. Nothing came of it. The time allowed for ratification passed, and his instructions of September 23 still direct him to say that the treaty can only be completed if certain specified steps are taken toward removing the causes of complaint. The same statement was made to Hop, when he proposed the exchange of ratifications, shortly before his departure for Vienna.⁵ But the illness and death of William's powerful champion, the Grand Pensionary Fagel, caused delay⁶; and, even after the

¹ Reports of Hop, June 17/27 and July 4, 1688.

² The speedy renewal of this treaty was described, both by Frederick and Croissy, as a special sign of close relations with William and the Netherlands. Compare Frederick to Diest, July 2, and Spanheim to Frederick, July 6/16. B. St. A.

³ On July 4 Hop writes, "Dat mijn Heer de Churfurst in verwachtinge was da thaar Ho. Mog. voor date van het uijtwisseln van ratificatien van de bovengeroerde conventie of acte van renouvellement, souden willen adjustiren het bewuste reglement tuschen beyde de voorschreven compagnien, ende de gereezene quartie over de fortien van Acada en Taccorary." H. R. A.

⁴ Frederick to Diest, June 22/July 2.

⁵ Report of Hop, October 3, 1688. H. R. A.

⁶ Diest was still urging the carrying out of the resolutions in May, 1689. See his correspondence with Estates in H. R. A.

Estates took the necessary resolutions, they were not pushed to completion. By this time the situation had, in any case, grown far beyond the limits of the old treaty; and Brandenburg was seeking a new and strong alliance with the Provinces and England. On the other hand it should be noted that, after Frederick announced the renewal to his foreign representatives, the treaty had been very generally looked upon as complete. In fact, as long as he needed to use it in explanation of his transfer of troops to the service of the Netherlands, he could not well deny its validity. Nor does he appear to have thought of doing so, except in the hope of making it a leverage for a settlement in the matter of the African Company. In fact Fuchs and Dankleemann distinctly declare to Hop, that Frederick has no intention of viewing it as other than valid.¹

These events, added to William's preliminary intercourse with other German princes, leave the ground as firm as may be for the meeting of Fuchs and Bentinck in August. Here the importance of Fuchs, who was at once statesman, minister, diplomatist, and envoy, is very conspicuous. Like Frederick William he had, for a time, supported the French alliance, but had become, at least since 1685, a leader of the hostile party. His instructions and reports² give a good picture of the actual meeting, tho the preliminary history has its own interest. Apparently, when word reached Berlin that someone must meet Bentinck, the Court found difficulty in choosing the proper agent, and in framing his instructions. There is an undated memorial of July, in which the name of Ruck³ is substituted for that of Grumbkow, who seems to have been first thought of as the agent of Brandenburg. It obviously served as the basis of certain opinions expressed by Fuchs, and with modifications for his instructions. This memorial proposed allow-

¹ Hop to Estates. Oct. 3, 1688. H. R. A.

² Ranke, Werke, XXI, 307-318, and Droysen, *Gesch. d. pr. Politik*, IV, 1, pp. 214-217.

³ Ruck was at this time Brandenburg agent at Altona.

ing the Netherlands to use five designated battalions, of five hundred men each, to be supported by them, since Frederick would replace them at once with new recruits. Also Ruck was to seek "subsidiën oder sonsten einige avantageuse conditiones," and to arrange the whole affair so as to avoid collision with France.¹

Upon these points Fuchs commented.² He suggested that it would be more practicable to offer a given number of men, which he increased to 4000, rather than specified regiments. As to the second article, concerning their support, he found nothing to say. He thought the question of subsidies so delicate that, if brought up carelessly, it might turn the Estates from Orange and the whole plan; but he felt sure that Orange himself could arrange to help Frederick, and this might be discussed with Bentinck. Fuchs went on to insist that such consideration and fear of France, as appeared in the memorial, would prevent all action whatever, and that alliances with Saxony, the House of Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel were advisable. In this memorial Fuchs advanced decidedly beyond the mere question at hand. He set forth his opinion upon the attitude which Frederick must take in regard to France, the plan of 1688, and the German Princes. While advocating no speedy rupture with France, he perceived clearly the danger

¹ Two minor changes were made in the memorial, aside from the substitution of Ruck's name for that of Grumbkow. The second article was changed to read, "Was dero verpflegung betrifft hat er dahin zu sehen dass dieselbe von dem Staat geschehen zumahl S. C. D. gesonnen sei alsofort neue werbungen—anzustellen." The reason first given had been, "solche als wie vor diesem von Sr. Ho't und des Staats seitens zu berlin vorgeschlagen worden." The fourth article read originally, "Es muss aber solche schickung der völcker—." This was changed to read, "Es wird aber dienlich sein solche schickung der völcker keinen anderen nahmen zu geben als dass selbigen nur geliehen werden, damit S. C. D. desfalls nicht mit Frankreich und anderen in collision gerahten mögen wie solches des Printzen von Oraniens Ho't selbst einlassen." B. St. A.

² B. St. A. Haake, page 33, gives a considerable quotation.

of too great caution, and the need of a new system of alliances. He distinguished between Orange and the Dutch Republic. He realized that it was not from the Provinces, but from William in England, that financial aid must be first sought. This is all stated briefly and without reserve, but carefully, and with thorough appreciation of conditions. A second memorial counsels sending a special messenger to Bentinck to complete arrangements, and considers at length the possible relations with the Landgrave. The position of Hanover is also mentioned again, and the opinion expressed that the Duke may be drawn away from France "wann der Printz von Oranien mit einige wirkligkeit dazur concurriren wolthe welches mit dem Herren von Bentinck zu concertiren."

The actual instructions are based on these memorials. Fuchs is to reach Bentinck secretly, and determine the sentiments of Orange and the Estates "wegen des gegenwertigen Englischen wesens." He is to reaffirm Frederick's promises, and to say that 4000 men will be placed in Cleves ready to march into the Netherlands. The negotiations with Hesse-Cassel, and the question of Hanover are to be discussed. Then come the two topics, money and the Orange inheritance, which play a large part in previous as well as later negotiations. The question of subsidies was important. Brandenburg needed an expensive army. Part of its support was one of the advantages she expected to draw from any alliance, with the subsidy paying powers. Like James II, both Frederick III and his father intended to combine this with complete independence of action, and were not always successful. As to the Orange inheritance, it would not seem to have been sufficiently emphasized. It was an old hope of Frederick William,¹ which is surely no less strong in the mind of his son. Even before he succeeded to the Electorate, Frederick was corresponding with Spanheim in regard to the claims of the Marquis de Sohre,² which continue to form a chief point of difference

¹ Several references in *Urkunden und Akten*, Vol. XX. Also strongly emphasized in the instructions for Fuchs, Apr. 28, '85.

² Frederick to Spanheim, April 28, 1688.

with Louis thruout July and August. The inheritance offered large possibilities of dynastic gain without war; and Haake is surely right in saying that hope of advance, without drawing the sword, was particularly likely to appeal to the Elector. It was too a very real hope, and of long past and future history. As compared with the Swedish scheme, it was not a matter requiring so much present haste, tho Haake surely overemphasizes that ephemeral northern plan, which was, after all, one of many.¹ But it is hidden enough to attract attention, while the importance of the Orange inheritance, in the mind of Frederick, is perhaps so obvious that it has somewhat escaped comment. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that the part it played in influencing his thought and action was very great.² Just at this time the question received other attention, aside from that mentioned above, one long instruction to Diest³ upon the subject being dated two days before that of Fuchs.

But the real cause of action must be sought elsewhere. It is not possible to feel that Frederick waited long to bargain, whatever his father might have done. The political position remained the first consideration, and he definitely directed that Fuchs handle the question of advantages "mit solcher behutsamkeit—damit es nicht scheine ob suchten wir einigen eigenutz darunter." This absence of pressure was probably very largely due to Fuchs' reading of the situation; and it was doubtless quite correct. Moreover Frederick could have no real hope of subsidies from William before the rupture with France. For that he was not prepared, nor is there any sign that William desired it at this time.

The meeting between Fuchs and Bentinck, at Celle, was

¹ Compare also Hans Rödding, "Pufendorf als Historiker und Politiker" (Halle, 1912), pp. 97-101.

² Burnet says: "As the elector is the prince of Orange's cousin germaine by his mother and heir by provision—so he not only has a particular friendship for him, but agrees with him in the same notions and designs." Foxcraft, Supplement to Burnet, p. 279.

³ July 19/29, 1688.

carefully arranged, and attracts no apparent attention.¹ Bentinck at once placed new emphasis on the necessity for speedy action. Otherwise James, supported by a packed Parliament and foreign mercenaries, would either gain control and ally himself with Louis, or his opponents would establish a neutral republic. Fuchs is led to believe that Orange will sail in about six weeks. Only success is to be expected, for England and Scotland desire it almost to a man; James could not depend on his army or navy; William would, in any case, have strength enough; and French aid, even if granted to James, would only increase the domestic unrest out of all proportion. Bentinck went on to report the "*secreta secretorum*" that an attempt by Louis to draw the Emperor into a great Catholic league had failed; and that William would have the support of the Netherlands both officially and unofficially. The only danger was a French attack during his absence, to prevent which he desired treaties with Celle and Hesse-Cassel, as well as with Brandenburg. Some discussion of the amount of "*Werbegeld*", and the possibility of securing 6000 troops, instead of 4000, followed. Fuchs was uninstructed on these points, but thought that the least which Frederick could accept would be 12 Reichsthalers for each footman, and forty for each horseman. It is noticeable that Fuchs makes no mention of subsidies, in spite of his instructions. He did, however, bring up the question of the Orange inheritance, and secured Bentinck's promise that William would make a new testament, in favor of Frederick, before going to England.

From these interviews at Celle grew the treaty completed there on August 5/15. Its terms provided that about six thousand troops should be given over to the Provinces in September. For recruiting expenses the amount suggested by Fuchs was to be paid. While in the Dutch service they were to be paid and supported by the Estates. This result seems to have been brought about rather by Fuchs than by

¹ The English agent at Regensburg was in possession of a rumor that Bentinck had accompanied the Landgrave to Berlin. Valkenier to the Estates, August 16, 1688. H. R. A.

Frederick. Frederick probably intended the transfer of four thousand troops by virtue of the earlier treaties, securing at the same time some definite concessions. But this treaty, negotiated by Fuchs, was certainly the almost necessary form, if William were to carry out his plans. On the other hand, Frederick seems, at first sight, to have agreed to furnish a considerable force with no apparent special gain for himself. Still it may be assumed that, however great his interest in the plan for general religious and political reasons, he saw also some particular advantages in it as it stood—at least the Orange inheritance, and the chance of employing his troops against France, while still postponing the break with that country. The negotiation leaves the impression that both Bentinck and Fuchs felt it best to paint matters as favorably as might be, making no mention of possible complications in Ireland, or the danger that William might not be able to leave the Continent. Still it seems evident that the Elector wished to appear as a leading, tho secret ally, and that William was glad to encourage him in this attitude, more glad than Frederick realized until he began to seek subsidies in January of the next year. Then he found William saying that he should not expect direct financial reward from his allies for taking part in a struggle to which his own interests called him.

This was, of course, a secret agreement, and the claim was always made that the regiments were furnished by virtue of earlier treaties.¹ In contrast with the renewal of June 20/30, it was a question of arrangements between Orange and Frederick with which the Estates have, for the moment, nothing to do. William expressed his gratification to Frederick in a personal letter,² reminding him that the time is short, and

¹ Compare, for instance, Spanheim to Frederick. Dec. 20/30, where he says that concerning the "cession ou joncture de quelques troupes aux Hollandais, je priois ledit de Croissy de considerer—que dailleurs ce n'estait qu'en execution des anciens traittes purement diffensifs et renouvelles des le commencement de la Regence de V. A. E." B. St. A.

² August 13, 1688. B. St. A.

that he ought to order his more distant regiments to march at once. In September they met at Minden, but little remains to show what took place. Pufendorf is silent, and Frederick's explanation, for Croissy, that it was a mere question of friendly intercourse is purely diplomatic.¹ They must have reviewed the whole contemporary situation; but there is no sign, then or later, of any particular further agreement. Whatever details may have been arranged doubtless lost much of their force, as a result of the rapid developments of September. Only a short time later William does not know,² without further correspondence, whether Frederick would allow the placing of an army near Wesel, or not. The probability that William would acquire the English crown may well have been mentioned; for in February, Frederick writes, "I cannot express the greatness of the joy caused in me, by the completion of the wishes which some years ago I had formed, and particularly six months ago at Minden."³ The interview would seem at least to have passed very pleasantly, with mutual satisfaction as to their several attitudes.⁴

During the next few weeks, while William completed his preparations, and Diest was in Berlin, Frederick devoted himself more and more openly to the cause. On his journey to Minden he had conferred with the Elector of Saxony at Annaburg. On his return he stopped at Hanover,⁵ receiving prom-

¹ Instructions for Spanheim, from Minden, Aug. 29/Sept. 8. As to the meeting with Orange, "So habet Ihr anzubringen dass zu derselben allein die nahe verwantniss und sonderbahre propension so einer zu dem andern billig trägt anlass gegeben, sonst aber von aufrichtung einer alliance und dergleichen nichts gedacht viel weniger solche geschlossen worden."

² William to Waldeck, Oct. 2, Müller, II, p. 111.

³ Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, William and Mary, I, page 10. Original in the Record Office.

⁴ Compare William to Frederick, Sept. 20, 1688. "Je me sens si vivement touche de toute les marques d'amitie dont V. A. E. m'a honore pendant que j'ay en la satisfaction d'estre aupres d'elle que je ne puis asses luy en temoigner—."

⁵ Haake says, page 36, "und kehrte über Hannover, wo er statt des

ises that the Duke would act, if the Empire were attacked. This was some advance over the very indefinite good wishes which Ernst August had sent to William a month earlier.¹ On the twentieth of September, Schomberg added the Brandenburg forces to the garrison of Cologne. A few days later Grumbkow left for Cleves to transfer the Brandenburg regiments to the Dutch service.² About this time Frederick gave up the idea of going to Prussia before conditions improved in the West. His regiments were marching, and recruiting was proceeding successfully. Further developments depended upon the action of Louis.

On October 7, the Elector, hunting in the neighborhood of Berlin, received word of the attack on the Palatinate. He returned at once to his Capital, conferred with the resident agents of the allies, and sent special representatives to their courts.³ Fuchs went to Celle, Hanover, Munster, and the Hague;⁴ Anhalt and Schmettau to Leipzig; Mandelslo to the

gehofften Anschlusses an den Defensivbund nur ein Neutralitätsversprechen durchsetzen konnte, in seine Residenz zurück." But in the instructions for Fuchs. Sept. 28, Frederick says in regard to Hanover, "Ihre Durchl. hette uns bey unserer jungsten anwesenheit festiglich versprochen, dass wan Frankreich das Reich attaquieren solte, Sie alsdan mit aller Ihrer Macht concurriren wolten, der casus were jetzo ohnstreitg entstanden." This is the important point, for no one was ready to go far before the beginning of the French attack.

¹ Ernst August to William, July 24/Aug. 3. "Ce m'est une mortification tres sensible de voir partir M. de Benting sen pouvoir satisfaire a la desmende qu'il ma fait de la parte de V. A.—Celle que V. A. vient de me donner de sa confiance me touche sensiblement elle peut estre assuree que je n'en abusere jamais—J'espere aussi qu'il ce presentera bientot une occasion pour moy plus favorable que la presente——." L. R. O.

² Report of Ham for Sept. 16/26, says that Grumbkow has left for Cleves, "om saken van importantie aldaar te beschicken en de bewuste 6000 Churfurstelijke Volkeren in den dienst van een naarburijs Geallieerde Macht in conformite van het secrete tractaat te doen overgaan." H. R. A.

³ Report of Ham, Oct. 10, 1688. H. R. A.

⁴ Instructions for Fuchs, Sept. 28/Oct. 8. B. St. A.

Frankish, Swabian and Upper Rheinisch circles. At Hanover Fuchs was also to meet the Hesse-Cassel minister, Görtz. From the correspondence of the next ten days sprang the conference at Magdeburg, and agreement on an organized line of defense. It is not necessary to overemphasize the part of Frederick. He probably did not suggest the conference. It is not mentioned in the instructions of Fuchs, but in his report from Hanover as if it had been suggested there. Certainly Fuchs found Hesse-Cassel and the House of Brunswick ready to concert all reasonable measures of defense.¹ Frederick was not the only one who felt a vital interest. It cannot be shown that he was more ready than the others to proceed to an immediate offensive, or that the hesitancy of the Duke of Hanover alone prevented this.² He had a far reaching plan of operations, and gladly prompted his allies to action; but that he would have hastened his own rupture with France, either with or without the support of Hanover, seems contrary both to the evidence, and the demands of the situation. At the same time he was willing, and very active, in doing what needed to be done. This was decisive in the matter of the Magdeburg Conference, and of the utmost importance.

Meanwhile, as a result of the French attack, William felt that he could persuade Frederick to further measures, since "il y a point d'autre moi en pour la seurete de ses propres estates."³ In two letters, of October 5, and October 15, he urged the hurrying of all possible troops to the Rhine, the

¹ Fuchs to Frederick, Oct. 3/13, from Celle. "Ich kann E. C. D. nicht genug beschreiben was vor einen eiffer man alhie gegen Frankreich spuren lassen." B. St. A.

² That the delay was the fault of Hanover seems to be the implication of Haake, pp. 50-54. But his evidence needs a great deal of strengthening. It seems inconceivable that, in October, "Der Gedanke war offenbar, des Gegners in Westen so schnell als möglich ledig zu werden, um die Kräfte in Bälde für den Norden wieder verfügbar zu haben;".

³ William to Frederick, Oct. 5, 1688. B. St. A.

employment of Frederick's influence with Saxony, and his presence at Minden or Sparenberg. This last suggestion came also from various other sources.¹ The Elector replied that orders for the march of his troops had been given, and that he himself would go to Westphalia.² These points were brought up again, when Fuchs was with the Prince at the end of the month. His mission dealt with the posting of troops, the necessity of calling a Parliament in England, and of bringing that country into the war without delay. He explained Frederick's position, the need of placing Brandenburg forces on the middle Rhine,³ and also in the North to observe Denmark. William answered with new expressions of gratitude, and repeated his thoughts as to Frederick's further movements, receiving similar promises. It was indeed rumoured at Berlin,⁴ as early as September 30, that the journey to his restless Prussian Duchy would be replaced by one to Wesel. On November 9, Frederick finally left Berlin, and traveling through Spandau, Hanover, Minden, and Sparenberg, reached Wesel on the fifth of December.⁵

The regular diplomatic intercourse of Brandenburg and the Provinces remained in the hands of Hop, and Ham, at Berlin, and of Diest at the Hague. Until his departure for Vienna, in October, Hop was chiefly occupied with the renewal of treaties, and the settlement with Denmark. As mediator between the Provinces and Denmark, Frederick, or at least his ministers, played no inconsiderable part.⁶ Diest, up to the end of August, was pressing the affair of the African

¹ Waldeck to William, Oct. 4. Muller, Vol. II, p. 113.

Diest to Frederick, Oct. 16/26. B. St. A.

² Frederick to William, Oct. 11/21. Draft in B. St. A.

³ Fuchs to Frederick, Oct. 12/22, from the Hague.

⁴ Report of Ham, Sept. 30. H. R. A.

⁵ The reports of Ham, who accompanied Frederick, cover many details of this journey.

⁶ The reports of Hop, particularly that of July 7, mention several points where the Brandenburg ministers interfered and secured agreement as to the preliminary treaty.

Company, the aid for the Piedmontese refugees, and other minor subjects. When he returned to the Hague, in October, the situation had distinctly changed. It was no longer a matter requiring great secrecy. France had delivered the first attack. The Estates were active. Everyone knew that England was the object of the preparations of Orange. Diest's papers now show Brandenburg as the acknowledged ally of the Provinces, in full communication with them on all points of common interest. During November and December, indeed, the relations of Frederick with the Estates were much more full and important than those with Orange.

These negotiations, from the middle of October, naturally center about military affairs. Agreement did not, by any means, follow as a matter of course. Not only the points of view as to the immediate aims to be sought, but also the opinions as to the best means of attaining them, constantly differed. The case was complicated, too, by the fact that Waldeck and the authorities at the Hague had both to be considered. Tho Frederick apparently recommended the same measures to both, without participation in the difficulties between them, he seems unwilling to attempt to work with Waldeck alone, and to have believed that his ends would be more surely attained thru constant persuasion at the Hague. Nor was Waldeck any more ready to act without authorization from the Estates. Frederick's attitude was always that of an ally against France, for at heart he realized that there could be no greater danger for him than that Louis should fall with destructive force upon the Netherlands. Nevertheless his plans inevitably design first to protect his own lands. To this end he believed it possible both to postpone his break with France and to use the Dutch army directly for his own greater security. That he consciously waited the result of the English undertaking cannot be shown, tho it is very evident that everything turned upon its success or failure, and that Europe had eyes for little else. Even Louis may have held back, somewhat, to see whether James would be able to do a con-

siderable portion of his fighting for him. And that Frederick wished still to gain time is obvious. Tho his policy, viewed as a whole, was sufficiently broad, it called for some delay in the declaration of his own offensive.

He had delivered to the Provinces, without previous bargaining, a considerable proportion of the forces prepared for action. Naturally some regret followed.¹ He doubtless felt not only the pressure of France, but also the decrease in his own independent power. Tho he aims, in what followed, to repair these evils, to turn all possible strength to the direct protection of his own lands, and to bring as much military force as might be, under his own control, he is also looking to the spring campaign. In order that it might be undertaken as advantageously as possible, and beyond his own borders, he found some preliminary clearing of the ground advisable. But Waldeck, in whose hands the decision as to the military plans remained, at least theoretically, had as many reasons for a wise defensive as Frederick. He viewed with large distrust any frittering away of the army on preliminary movements, before it reached its full strength, before the allies were gathered, and Frederick was ready himself to take an active part. And he was supported in this attitude by William, and also by the Estates.

Thru the connection with Furstenberg, the French had, practically speaking, taken possession of various points in the Archbishopric, even before the attack on the Palatinate. From these positions they constantly threatened the city of Cologne, and the neighboring territories. Thus William's idea, after the direction of the main French attack was known, had been to gather an army near Wesel, where it could protect that comparatively unready town, as well as Cologne and the Provinces.² If Frederick did not wish this, he thought, apparently, that the willingness of the Elector Palatine to receive

¹ Fridag to Leopold, quoted in Haake, p. 55.

² William to Waldeck, Oct. 2, Müller, II, p. 111.

troops in Julich or Berg, might be considered. What Frederick might have desired at this date, October 2, is not clear. But surely the change in tone between the instructions for Diest of October 3, and those for Fuchs five days later is marked. The former are still very general as far as actual discussion of the central question goes. Diest is to give assurance of Frederick's desire for a good understanding, and his anxiety over the danger to Protestantism. But Fuchs was to explain Frederick's plan for his own action, still a defensive plan, to be sure, and induce the authorities at the Hague to make a particular disposition of their forces. Frederick's idea required that they place an army between the Rhine and the Maas, not far from Cologne; or at least furnish, for this purpose, the Brandenburg regiments, tho the latter should remain in the service of the Estates, and be supported by them.¹ When Fuchs proposed this station for the army, Orange answered that he had favored it himself,² but relinquished it when Schomberg pointed out that troops, so posted, would either have Rheinberg at their back, or else the enemy could easily crowd between them and Cologne. This reasoning Fuchs considered so forcible that he allowed the matter to rest until he received further orders,³ for which, however, he did not wait.⁴

¹ "Dass der Staat zu formirung eine solchen armee nur wenigstens unsere Ihn zugeschickete Troupen stellen, und uns abfolgen lassen 'mochte, Sie hatten dennoch in dessen pflichten stehen bleiben und anders nicht als zu bedeckung und versicherung Ihrer Hochm. landen employerit werden, welche letztere beide puncte er darumb anzuführen hat, damit der Staat demselben die ubernommene verpflegung continuiren, und wir die mittel so dadurch erspahret werden, zu anwerbung und unterhaltung mehrer manschaft anwenden können." Instructions for Fuchs, Sept. 28.

² Apparently some report to this effect had reached Berlin; for a rescript to Fuchs dated Oct. 7/17, says, "Und weill man alhier schon durch den Von Benting die nachricht erhalten, dass man dort zu den erwusten campement inclinire, also ist zu hoffen Ihr werdet auch dort mit Gottes hülfe—."

³ Fuchs from the Hague, Oct. 12/22.

⁴ On Oct. 16/26, he was already at Nymegen.

So it was decided that Waldeck place the main field force at Ruhrort. Diest, upon his own initiative, had given many reasons why it should be placed rather at Büderich; but those in authority considered their design better, as affording the same protection for Cleves, and giving Cologne greater confidence. Frederick too, for his own reasons, desired that Waldeck's army be advanced beyond any such position as Büderich. In Diest's instructions for November 6, he contends that it should be used to clear the enemy from such posts as Arnsberg and Werle; and after being held together until the French go into winter quarters, should be stationed along the Rhine, rather than on the Yssel or Maas. Thus tho Frederick himself was not ready to undertake an offensive, he planned that Waldeck should do so, even before Louis had declared war against the Netherlands. While Diest broached this subject at the Hague, Spaen was sent to Waldeck on the same mission. Fagel's illness made it impossible for him to enter into the matter; but Dykvelt said that both Orange and the Estates had given Waldeck authority to concert and undertake measures against the enemy, to occupy places which would protect Westphalia and allow the aiding of Cologne and Coblenz, and especially to defend the Elector's territories. Diest judged, however, that while Frederick could effect more by dealing directly with Waldeck,¹ still the Provinces did not wish to undertake anything, for the present, on land. He thought that the results would be best attained if Frederick proceeded with the desired preparations as a matter pertaining to the Circle, merely securing Dutch troops as auxiliaries.² But this was not at all the Elector's idea. He wished Waldeck to do this. He himself could go no farther without the break with

¹ Diest to Frederick, Nov. 23, "dan gewiss ist es dass E. C. D. viel bequamer die bekannte intention erreichen werden wan Sie allein mit Sr. Fürstl. Gnd. von Waldeck tractiren lassen, als wan darüber alhie bey dem Estat deliberation solthe vorfallen."

² Diest to Frederick, Nov. 23, "wan es E. C. D. als von Creyses wegen thete und dieses Staets troupen nuhr als auxiliaire dahin detachiret werden." B. St. A.

France, which was more and more imminent. Besides he was not ready to take the offensive; nor was he willing to give any agent authority really to conclude arrangements, until he had approved each detail. Waldeck felt hampered, too, by his military weakness and the dissensions at the Hague. He held his army, as late in the season as possible, at Duisburg, discouraging French raids in November. When they threatened Cologne,¹ he threw some troops into that city, in accordance with the orders of Orange.² He prepared to march to the relief of Düsseldorf, but found it unnecessary.³ Further than this he did not feel able to go, at least without special authorization. Thus, before agreement was reached, the time for action had passed.

Here matters rested when the meeting at Wesel occurred. Waldeck had feared to expect much from this conference,⁴ tho both he and William felt a definite concert with Brandenburg to be necessary. Nor had Frederick been less urgent, tho he certainly caused delay by his demands, and by his intention of passing on each step in the negotiations himself. But the time had now arrived when the army must go into winter quarters and some mutual agreement was essential. At Wesel, Frederick, Waldeck, the deputies of the Estates, and the Brandenburg ministers and commanders, held various discussions, between the sixth and the twelfth of December. There, too, representatives of Cologne and the Elector Palatine appear with claims for aid. The result was a conservative, and somewhat indefinite, defensive agreement, with which Waldeck seems fairly satisfied; but which was probably unsatisfactory to Frederick at the time, and became more so after the developments of the following days. It was also decided

¹ Bilderbreek to the Estates from Cologne, Nov. 16 & 30. H. R. A.

² Waldeck to the Estates from Duisburg, Nov. 4/14. H. R. A.

³ Waldeck to the Estates from Duisburg, Nov. 5/15. H. R. A.

⁴ Waldeck to William, Nov. 13/23, "le concert a faire avec Mr. l'Electeur de Brandebourg sera un peu difficile, puis que l'on pretendra des choses que je ne puis faire." Müller, II, p. 117.

here, that, when common action was undertaken, command should remain with the officer of highest rank in either army. If two officers were of the same rank, precedence should follow the age of their respective commissions.¹

Thus, until December, Frederick had done what his own central interest demanded, while still avoiding that complete break with France, which surely appeared contrary to his good, and the advantage of which to the common cause cannot be proved. Since William and Waldeck incline, for so long, to purely defensive movements on the Continent, it is difficult to date their desire that Frederick discontinue these relations. At first Waldeck, at least, had feared that he would move too rapidly in breaking with the past.² There was no outward sign of desire for change, until the negotiations appeared to be taking a new and dangerous course. As long as Frederick's readiness for common defensive action and agreement persisted, the old order of things, as regards France, fell in well enough with their ideas. So far this intimacy had been practical and diplomatic, rather than logical. It was based on the quibble that, tho Frederick's every important action arrayed him with the allies, and tho he was repeatedly warned of the view which Louis must take, he had never given any cause for offense. On the one hand he acted, on the other he corresponded and explained. And he had not neglected to act because "ombrage" at Paris might result.

Nor had the relations with France been particularly noteworthy. In the beginning, largely thru trust in Rebenac's good offices,³ the Elector hoped to draw some fresh subsidy payments from France. But it soon became a mere question of keeping the diplomatic relations open as long as possible. To

¹ The protocol of what occurred at Wesel in the conference of Nov. 30/Dec. 10, was ratified by Frederick, Jan. 26, 1689. H. R. A.

² Müller, Wilhelm III und Waldeck, II, p. 31.

³ Rebenac had hinted as early as 1685 that some "solide proposition" ought to be offered to Brandenburg, Urk. & Akt. XX, 1011.

Frederick to Spanheim, Apr. 30/May 10, says: "Insonderheit

this end the negotiations for the renewal of treaties continued, in the form of more or less consideration of Louis' preliminary demands. Also promptly and repeatedly Spanheim was explaining Bentinck's mission in June, the renewal of the treaties with the Provinces, the meeting with Orange at Minden, the movements of Schomberg, and like matters, which taken together indicated clearly enough the aim of Brandenburg's policy. But it must be emphasized that not Louis alone made preliminary demands. There is no sign that Frederick would have considered a settlement, unless he first received large payments; and, even then, it was to be a new, purely defensive treaty, which would leave him unhampered in the actual conflict. Nor does he hesitate to express, in the strongest terms, his disapproval of the policies of Louis, and the impossibility of any agreement unless France withdrew from her extreme position.¹ As for Louis, he too had been willing to keep matters open, and doubtless felt that only loss could come from crowding Brandenburg, while there might be gain in waiting. Neither considered that there was, for the moment, any chance of an understanding.

Under these circumstances the correspondence dragged on thru November. Then the balance of affairs began to change. The news from England aroused fears for James.² The strength of the allies, at least defensively, grew rapidly formidable. Frederick had started to the West in person, and further regiments were on the march to reinforce his army in Cleves. No great prophetic vision was needed to enable Louis to foresee that the Conference at Magdeburg was about to be followed by a closer association with the Netherlands. The time had come when Brandenburg must be forced either, at

habt Ihr auch mit gebührenden fleiss die zahlung der uns noch rückständigen subsidien gelder zu urgiren worunter euch der Graff von Rebenac ausser zweiffle gern an hand gehen und alle gute officia leisten wird."

¹ Frederick to Spanheim, Sept. 28/Oct. 8, Oct. 21.

² Spanheim to Frederick, Nov. 19/29, and Nov. 23/Dec. 3. B. St. A.

least to declare openly her neutrality, or else to accept the dangers incident to hostility. And on the Elector's fears Louis hoped to build.

Thus came the December days and the resulting accusation that Frederick's attitude was hesitant and uncertain. The relations with the Provinces still continue in their natural course, tho affected in detail by the new conditions. As regards France, the situation becomes more urgent, tho it may reasonably be questioned whether there was much essential vacillation. It is well to remember that the Elector and his advisers were not really surprised by the French attack. It was inevitable. After the September Manifesto there is no sign that they viewed the intercourse with Louis as anything but temporary. Meanwhile, however, they expected to maintain the pose of complete innocence of offence toward that King. It is not possible to follow the changes of Frederick's mind, to know in just how large a degree he may have hoped for terms, or how near success the agitation of the French party may sometimes have been. But it is possible to follow the external course of affairs, and here the wavering is superficial, and confined to uncertainty as to just how long Louis would continue to postpone his attack.

Surely Frederick felt the need of extending this period to the best of his ability. It was no empty shadow which he feared. If Louis saw the situation beginning to turn against him, as early as the end of November, it was far less easy for the allies to feel safe. The French devastation, in the Palatinate, in Trier, in Würtemberg, lay open before their eyes. Louis was opposed by so few troops that it seemed he might break out, with destructive force, at any point he cared to choose. Cleves, west of the Rhine, lay particularly open to attack. He felt that he might frighten Frederick with the Polish danger; and it needed no skill to show the chances of an explosion in the North, among the smouldering hostilities between Denmark, Sweden, and their allies. In fact, if his ability to take the offensive had approached his pretensions, the possibilities

for him in November seem endless. But Louis' ability, such as it was, remained that of diplomat, rather than of statesman or general. The explanation of his course lies largely in the hope of weaving victory out of the tangled mass of negotiations and half measures, before a general conflagration destroyed them. He hoped to do just what he claimed to be doing, to secure peace by a one-sided war, after having led up to war by a one-sided truce.

Frederick's view was, however, less distracted than Louis had hoped. He well knew the danger in the North, and was preparing to meet it, but believed it possible to control. In regard to Poland he remained less uneasy than might be expected. The court at Warsaw was not friendly, and he had plenty of evidence of French efforts against him there.¹ But the state of factions made any open attack doubtful and distant, even tho he might not succeed in placating the King by explanations of the disputed points, and by promises to support the election of his son to follow him on the Polish throne.² Some danger there was in the support which Prussian malcontents might receive in Poland; and Frederick desired to go to Prussia, that he might receive the homage of the Estates, and arrange matters there, especially in regard to the revenues. It is probable, too, that he felt increased concern just at this period. Still he evidently did not consider the immediate danger to be very great.

The real danger was in the country of the lower Rhine. The French had left Coblenz in ruins, and for some months thereafter kept Cologne in continual fear of a like fate. They had demanded 200,000 Reichsthalers from Julich, under threat of burning, and it was reported that they expected to raise 1,000,000 from Julich, Berg, Mark, and Cleves, by this

¹ Wichert to Frederick, Oct. 9, 1688, and Nov. 24, 1688. B. St. A. Spanheim to Frederick, Nov. 26/Dec. 6, and Nov. 30/Dec. 10. B. St. A.

² Instructions and secret instructions for Dohna (the special agent to Poland in these months), Oct. 28/Nov. 7. B. St. A.

method.¹ What followed is clear enough. Frederick and his ministers were anticipating an attack. The French offensive seemed advancing northward, as well as toward the East. Already, on November 14/24, Spanheim had been told that he might prepare to leave Paris as soon as he received orders. Then came the suggestions that some arrangement might be reached for sparing Cleves thru the Winter.² Spanheim's instructions, of December 3/13, were a natural reply for Frederick to make. They emphasize his desire for peace, and promise that he will, in so far as circumstances allow, keep the way open for an agreement between France and the Empire, not, however, on the French basis. In return he hopes that Cleves will be spared. These instructions were hardly on their way, before Frederick learned of the French demand for a contribution from Cleves. Possibly, if his new hope had not seemed so ruthlessly shattered, Frederick might, from the first news of this terrorism, have taken the decision to continue the negotiations as long as he could. Disillusionment may have sharpened the tone of the instructions of December 5/15, by which Spanheim was commanded to leave Paris without further orders, unless the demand were withdrawn. Frederick probably felt that the rupture could not be postponed, or at least that a daring stand was the only chance to secure both postponement and a continuation of the positive side of his policy. Soon, however, the hope which had been held out to him returned to strengthen the tendency still to try the effect of negotiation on this new question. For this was, from Frederick's point of view, hardly a continuation of the old relations. They were at an end. The only question was the possibility of bargaining for the temporary safety of lands which he did not yet feel able to protect by force.

Aside from any chance of success, he needed to gain time. Many of his troops were still on the march. The Swedish

¹ Bilderbreck to the Estates from Cologne, Nov. 23, 1688. H. R. A.

² Spanheim's report of Nov. 26/Dec. 6. B. St. A.

regiments had not yet arrived in the Netherlands. The existing agreement with the Provinces promised no aid for the threatened district. Probably, also, he hoped actually to secure the neutrality of Cleves during the winter, and was willing to carry into effect the concessions mentioned to Gravel¹ and in Spanheim's instructions.² If his only aim had been to gain time, a very limited degree of wisdom would have suggested taking some one of his allies into confidence. Since, however, the only concession which could tempt Louis was open neutrality, the hope vanished. Frederick would not reconsider this question, unless the French position altered, and refused their propositions even more decisively than they refused his. The rupture resulted, nor was it repaired by a final effort, on the part of the French, to add bribes to the pressure of Frederick's own fears.

To give an exact date for the end of these negotiations is not possible. Some doubt must remain as to what may be concealed in the silence of the weeks, between Spanheim's recall and his withdrawal from Paris. The most obvious, and also the most likely, theory is that Frederick viewed the matter as ended with the recall of Spanheim on January 5, but that Fuchs managed cleverly to delay the final answer to Gravel, and that Spanheim took the responsibility of awaiting further orders, because of the new offers from the French. Certainly Croissy, and Gravel, gave Frederick ample opportunity for more correspondence, had he desired. On the whole, Frederick's wavering seems, then, to be confined to the fact that he went rather further than was wise, from the point of view of his policy, in Spanheim's instructions of December 5/15, and later withdrew, for a short period, from this position. More correctly stated, one set of negotiations was ended by the French "Brandbrieven," and a new and much narrower transaction results.

¹ The French agent at Frederick's court since the recall of Rebenac.

² Dec. 10/20, and Dec. 12/22.

Circumstances were thus undergoing a considerable change, from Frederick's standpoint, since the interviews at Wesel. On December 15 he wrote Spanheim that he had never done anything "welches auch nur den schein einer hostilität haben könnte." He had hoped to extend this attitude, since the position of the Upper-German powers was still undefined, effective military support from the Protestant allies doubtful, and Münster wavered without end. But now, tho he turned for a time to the propositions for the neutrality of Cleves, his attention to military preparations have a no less evident, and a more logical and permanent place in his policy. This latest experiment with France, and the resulting doubt of his intentions on the part of his allies, influence only the details of his relations with the Netherlands, while their main tendencies continue unchanged.¹

The agents of the Estates left Wesel on the twelfth of December, and Waldeck followed on the fourteenth. The next day came the news of the French requisition, and the attempt to put off the evil day resulted. At the same time Frederick hurried the march of his troops, the construction of bridges at Wesel, the establishment of cavalry patrols on the left of the Rhine,² and urged new measures at the Hague, preparatory to his own visit there. He determined to post all possible troops in the neighborhood of Wesel, so that an army of from ten to fifteen thousand could be brought together within twenty-four hours. Diest was to communicate this intention, to the Estates, with the suggestion that Cologne be advised to accept neutrality, since Frederick would need his troops now stationed in that city. If he met opposition upon this point, Diest should proceed to demand that two additional regiments be camped on the Yssel, and should secure a speedy and

¹ On Frederick's relations with France compare Meinecke: Brandenburg und Frankreich 1688 (Historische Zeitschrift, Bd. 62).

² Haake, p. 69.

categorical answer.¹

When Diest discussed these proposals with the committee appointed for conference,² they objected strongly to the first plan, as Cologne would no more remain neutral than Mainz had done, when it fell under French control. Indeed they expressed the intention of increasing the Dutch contingent in Cologne. The reinforcement of Schlagenburg, who commanded on the Yssel, they promised to take up with Waldeck. Waldeck told Diest that he had supposed that the position of the troops had been finally arranged at Wesel, but that he would see what changes could be made. A few days later a decision, partly meeting Frederick's demands, was reached.³ The Estates already knew of the propositions for the neutrality of Cologne, and were exerting every influence against their acceptance.⁴ It is likely that this was what Frederick expected, and that additional force on the Yssel was his real aim. This is in complete accord with his policy, both before and after; and Diest certainly understood the matter thus, for he brought up first the withdrawal of the garrison from Cologne, using that as a background for the other plan. If his aim had been to carry thru the Cologne matter, the order and the method of discussion would have been different. Frederick, too, dropped the matter except to urge the speedy completion of the promise to reinforce the garrison, as he considered Cologne in great immediate danger. A few days later he was himself at the Hague; and, while the news from Paris brought the old order to a close, that from London and Vienna robbed the new of its worst terrors.

This journey, which had been under consideration for some time, was explained in a variety of ways. Frederick

¹ Frederick to Diest, Dec. 7/17.

² Diest to Frederick, Dec. 11/21.

³ Diest to Frederick, Dec. 14/24.

⁴ Report of Bilderbrek to the Estates, from Cologne, Dec. 28.

wrote to William that he was following his suggestion,¹ to Mary that he desired to make her his compliments in person,² to Spanheim that he wished the Electress to see the Netherlands, as she had never before had an opportunity.³ Waldeck urged the visit,⁴ probably in order to draw him away from Gravel and the French party. Frederick, himself, may have desired, originally, to further the matter of a loan, and to feel the ground as to the possibility of extending his personal influence in the Netherlands. Between December 7, when the letter to Mary gives the first news of his intentions, and December 30, when he left Wesel, matters had, however, moved rapidly; and his chief traceable interest becomes the conference on military affairs. The question of the neutrality of Cleves played no visible part. The journey was determined upon before this matter came to the front, and it is evident later that his allies are informed by others of these negotiations. Consequently doubt of Frederick took root, a danger to which he could not have been blind,⁵ tho he trusted, as usual, to later explanations for its removal. Here lies the strongest reason for believing that the French negotiation must have been more than a mere plan to gain time, that he retained some hope of success. But this meant in his mind, at least so long as he was the other party to the contract, no sacrifice of the cause.

Regarding Frederick's desire to extend his influence in the Netherlands, the information is scattering. Necessity made it

¹ Frederick to William, Jan. 3, 1689, from the Hague. "Seit dem nun habe ich der mit Ew. Hoheit genommene abrede zu folge meine reyse ferner anhero fortgesetzt."

² Frederick to Mary, Nov. 27/Dec. 7, 1688. B. St. A.

³ Frederick to Spanheim, Dec. 18/28, "umb unsere Herzgeliebten Gemahlinnen—welche selbige Provintzien annoch nicht gesehen dieselbe zu zeigen."

⁴ Waldeck to William, Dec. 28. Müller, II, p. 123.

⁵ Compare, for instance, the rescript to Spanheim, Dec. 3/13, "doch alles mit solcher behutsamkeiht damit der aldort noch anwesende Ambas. von Hog. Mog. und andere wohlintentionirte keine ungleiche opinion deshalb von uns nehmen."

a very secret matter. The urgency of passing events, the judgment of Frederick or his advisers, crowd it somewhat into the background. But there can be no doubt that, originally, he had many plans, probably learned in part from the old Elector, as to the possibilities offered by the situation, for increasing his importance at many points.¹ It was, however, thru the absence of Orange that he hoped especially to raise himself to a leading position in western Europe. He felt that someone, and naturally none but himself, must take William's place on the Continent. Probably some secret steps were taken in this direction at the Hague, tho Frederick instructs Diest and Spaen to explain that such reports were mere inventions of the French agents.² At any rate the instructions for Schmettau³

¹ Compare, for instance, a report of Fuchs, from the Hague. Oct. 12/22, in which he suggests placing 5000 or 6000 troops on the middle Rhine, in order to increase Brandenburg's importance with the Empire and the Emperor. B. St. A.

² Frederick to Diest, Feb. 1/11. "Wir geben euch auch wiewohl in höchsten geheimb zu vernehmen was massen uns gantz neulich unter andern advantageusen conditionen so uns Frankreich offeriren lassen—auch dies gewesen dass sie uns zum gouvernement in denen Niederlandischen provincien beforderlich seyn wolten, Nuhn haben wir alle solche offeren hautement verworfen und synd bestandigh entschlossen bey der guthen Parthey zuleben and zusterben. Weilen aber zu besorgen es mochte Frankreich diess bey den Staat und in England unter handt dargestalts vorstellen lassen, als hetten wir unser gedanken auf besagten gouvernement gerichtet umb dadurch ombrage und jalousie unter der guthen parthey anzurichten, so habet ihr dem Rath. Pen. wie wohl in vertrauen hievon nachricht zugeben und so wohl bey demselben als auch sonst wan etwa davon gesprochen solthe werden zu contestiren dass uns dergleichen niemahlen in die gedanken kommen, zugeschweigen dass wir jemahls einzige propositions desshalb an Frankreich hetten thuen lassen noch auch Frankreich an uns, und wurde vielleicht was bey jüngsten unser anwesenheit in Holland unter der handt ausgesprenget worden ob wohlten wir so lange daselbst verbleiben bis des Princen Lbd. wiederkeme, aus eben dem frantzosischen artificio herruhren daher wir dann hoffen wolten man wurde demselben keinen glauben bey messen." B. St. A.

³ Feb. 19, 1768. B. St. A.

show, more in detail, a part of his hope. Here he proposes that, if William can not return to the Continent, some other ought, even for his own good, to become Stadtholder. For this position, under the regency of one of his younger brothers, the Elector suggests his own unborn second son. There is also a hint, of these days, that Frederick had some thought of a return to the Netherlands in an undined but important capacity.¹ How far his dreams may have reached, it is not possible to say.

Meanwhile the doubt in regard to his intentions had not diminished, and there were many who found it to their advantage to spread suspicion among the allies. In January the interest of the Estates in the neutrality negotiations appear in two separate instructions to Ham, as a result of which he questioned Fuchs and Dankelmann on the twelfth, and a few days later talked with the Elector himself. The result was the same in each case. The desire to gain time is the explanation given, together with the statement that the negotiations are at an end.² As proof a copy of the order to Schöning, to make requisitions in Cologne, was given to Ham. A like explanation was made to the German allies, when they complain of the same rumours.³ For even a longer period the interest in Frederick's personal movements continued to form a chief point of the intercourse initiated by the Estates and William.⁴ The desire of the autumn, that Frederick should come to the

¹ Zeitung from Minden, Jan. 13/23. "Es seindt auch vielfältige instances bey deroselben geschehen alldar zu residiren und sich der protection des Landes bey diesen gefährlichen zeiten anzunehmen welches S. C. D. endlich mit der zugebenen Hoffnung einer schleunigen wiederkunfft abgelehnt." The words "mit—Hoffnung" were originally written "mit dem versprechen", which strengthens the feeling that there was much here which remains dark.

² Reports of Ham, Jan. 8/18, 1689, and Jan. 3/13, 1689.

³ Report of Ham, Jan. 11/21, 1689.

⁴ Ham is constantly reporting upon this question thruout December to April.

William to Waldeck, Jan. 1/11, "Si Mr. l'Electeur de Branden-

West, found its sequel in the repeated demand that he should not go to Prussia during the Winter. The journey was postponed from time to time but, not until April, does Ham feel that it will not take place.

While the Elector was in Holland the new conferences on military affairs occurred.¹ Frederick's promises, made at Wesel, were renewed. The protection of Wesel was provided for, as also the reinforcing of the garrison at Cologne by Brandenburg troops. Their place at Wesel was to be taken by forces of the Provinces. It was further provided that Frederick's army should be at Waldeck's service, if common action seemed advisable on the west bank of the Rhine. Nothing, however, was arranged as to the protection, under all circumstances, of the threatened portion of Cleves. The matter was left to decision when the case should arise. It must be remembered that the Provinces were, themselves, expecting a direct attack at this time, that they felt the need of considering the protection of the Spanish Netherlands as well as of Cleves, and that they wished to wait until their forces reached their full strength, before engaging themselves too deeply. Waldeck, too, tho he realized the need of doing what was necessary to keep Frederick from dissatisfaction,² felt that he was prone to constant demands for help,³ while he had, at the same time, been careless and tardy in his own preparations;⁴ and Waldeck probably thought that too much readiness to aid, on the part of his allies, would only increase the Elector's delay.

Thus the conference had left Brandenburg still unsatisfied. Three days after its conclusion Frederick was already seeking

bourg est encore a la Haye au nom de Dieu tasches a le de tourner de son voyage de Prusse, il expose tout sans necessite, voila encore des effects des conseils corrompus par l'argent de la France." Müller II, p. 128.

¹ Protocol of the conferences of Jan. 5 and Jan. 9. H. R. A.

² Waldeck to William, Jan. 28, 1689. Müller, II, p. 130.

³ Waldeck to William, Nov. 23, and Dec. 28. Müller.

⁴ Waldeck to William, Dec. 28, and Dec. 9. Müller.

his ends by other means. Since, in the previous promises as regards aid for Wesel, "dabey gefuget so viele die forces des Staats es zulassen welches etwas general,"¹ therefore Diest was to ask that Schlangenburg be at once reinforced until he had not less than 6000, and be ordered to join Schöning on demand. Also the Provinces ought to place stores at Wesel, for the support of their troops. To a portion of this request Waldeck and the Estates decided to agree.² They promised both the regiments and the orders for Schlangenburg. The meeting, between Waldeck and Barfus at Arnheim, probably completed these concessions, which were made, in part at least, thru fear that Frederick might still be prevailed upon to accept neutrality.³ Regarding the stores at Wesel, Waldeck however reminded Diest that, according to the concert, such preparations east of the Rhine should be made by Brandenburg.⁴ He added that many complaints were coming to him of the low state of supplies there. Diest and Frederick both declared that he had been misinformed, tho Schöning was complaining of serious lack of stores.⁵

This was the beginning of a long series of demands, by which Frederick sought to acquire Dutch troops. His first aim was to persuade Waldeck and the Estates constantly to reinforce Schlangenburg and Nymegen, by moving their troops, and stationing there the Swedish regiments, and those return-

¹ Frederick to Diest, from Amsterdam, Jan. 2/12. Diest is to ask that Schlangenburg be reinforced to 6000, "und er beordret werde mit demselben so balde unser Gen. Feldm. Lieut. begehren wird zu ihm zustossen—Es wurde aber solchen falles der Staat einig magasin so wohl aufs Issel als auch in Wesel selber—formiren müssen." B. St. A.

² Diest to Frederick, Jan. 8/18, and Jan. 11/21, 1689

³ Waldeck to William, Jan. 28. "je joint icy la disposition qu'il m'a fallu faire avec Mr. Schoning ce qui m'occupe bien des troupes mais sans cela il auroit fort seconde les sentiments de la neutralité." Müller, II, p. 131.

⁴ Diest to Frederick, Jan. 11/21.

⁵ Schöning to Frederick, Dec. 27/Jan. 6, Jan. 4/14, Jan. 12/22.

ing from England. Secondly he hoped to secure the use of a large portion of these forces for his own plans, defensive and offensive. Primarily he aimed to provide definitely for the protection of his own lands, including the much discussed Cleves, west of the Rhine. Also he wished thoroughly to safeguard Cologne. But as the weeks pass without French movements of importance, he turned to aggressive plans for clearing the country below Cologne, in preparation for the main campaign. Similar ideas he had expressed in November. Now, however, he himself was ready to take an active part. The allied forces were increasing. The news from England was encouraging. The latest meeting with the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel at Minden, and with the heads of the House of Brunswick at Hanover, promised a further advance on the part of the allies of the Magdeburg Conference. Then, too, the French were weakened by the English developments. And the south German forces were gathering.

Thus, on January thirtieth, he was already planning to drive the enemy from Berg and Westphalia, and wished Waldeck to hurry the promised forces to the Yssel, and to strengthen the garrison of Cologne.¹ On the fourth of February, he wrote Diest to demand, for Schöning, the support of Schlangenburg and the garrison of Nymegen, if the French attempted anything in Cleves.² His aim was to secure the protection of his territories, west of the Rhine, by the Dutch, while keeping his own army very largely at Wesel.³ On the twentieth, the French having at last attempted some raids, he asked that Schlangenburg and Aylva be ordered to join Schöning at once, and aid him to carry out his orders to defend the

¹ Frederick to Diest, from Hanover, Jan. 20/30, 1689.

² Jan. 25/Feb. 4. Diest is to see that, if anything is attempted by the French "alsdann unserm dem von Schöning alsofort auf seine requisition nicht allein von dem corpo so unter dem General Major Schlangenburg an der Issel stehet sondern auch von der guarnison aus Nimwegen alle mögliche assistens darwider geleistet."

³ Diest to Frederick, Feb. 11/21.

threatened districts, and to advance to the support of Julich and Dusseldorf.¹ Barfus arrived in the Hague, on the twenty-first, to urge these same measures.² In the first days of March,³ Frederick was still emphasizing the clearing of the enemy from the east side of the Rhine, and on the west the protection of Cleves, the raid into Cologne, and the crippling of the French outposts.

On these various points Waldeck took a cautious stand in which he was supported by William and the Estates.⁴ He expressed his willingness to support Schöning when the common good demanded; but, at least until January twentieth, he was expecting a direct attack on the Netherlands. He thought that it had been agreed, and wisely agreed, at Wesel and the Hague, that the west side of the Rhine could not be fully protected.⁵ He did not believe in spending force on preliminary movements, especially those suggested by Frederick, in the then existing state of the weather and the roads. He felt that only gain could result from waiting for the English regiments, the troops of Munster, and other additions to the fighting strength. He refused to sanction the use of his forces on the east side of the Rhine,⁶ and this decision Frederick accepted.⁷ Nor was he willing to place more men in Cologne, or further to reinforce Schlangenburg,⁸ who was at best a very unruly and unreliable subordinate.⁹ He found it neither possible, nor wise, to make

¹ Frederick to Diest, Feb. 10/20, and Feb. 12/22.

² Diest to Frederick, Feb. 12/22.

³ Frederick to Diest, Feb. 20/Mar. 2.

⁴ Diest to Frederick, Feb. 8/18. Waldeck expresses himself as to Frederick's plans, and adds, "zumahlen dan Sr. Hoheit der Printz von Oranien noch dieser post geschrieben dass man sich nicht ahn kleyne sachen attachiren und bey dem anfang der Campagne desswegen exponiren mogte."

⁵ Diest to Frederick, Feb. 18/28.

⁶ Diest to Frederick, Feb. 5/15.

⁷ Frederick to Diest, Feb. 13/23.

⁸ Diest to Frederick, Feb. 8/18.

⁹ Müller, II, p. 46.

the desired arrangements for the protection of Cleves or to place Schlangenburg and Aylva at the service of Schöning, without conditions. Very likely he was already conscious of the tendency on the part of Brandenburg,¹ of which he complained so strongly later,² to seek temporary reinforcements, on various pretexts, which they then sought to keep indefinitely. These decisions the Elector seeks persistently to alter. Waldeck did, however, send Aylva, with a small force, into Cleves to do what could be done, and agreed to leave him there as long as possible. Also he sent one thousand men to Julich. Finally, much against his judgment,³ he allowed Aylva to join Schöning in the expedition, into Cologne and Julich, which resulted in the engagement at Urdingen, and the withdrawal of the French from all their minor outposts.

During this period some other matters were taken up. The question of the loan of 200,000 Reichsthalers, on which a decision was repeatedly promised, dragged on from early December until April. The loan formed part of Frederick's whole financial scheme. There is no doubt that the financial pressure was becoming noticeable. As in the case of Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick, the Brandenburg troops had been transferred to the Provinces without subsidy agreements. The revenues of Prussia were not immediately forthcoming. The expenses were considerable. Thus every source of saving and profit was watched. The Provinces were not pressed for subsidies. Those Frederick expected to draw from England. In

¹ Waldeck to William, Feb. 2/12. Müller, II, p. 134.

² Waldeck to William, May 8, 1689. "The Elector of Brandenburg hinders me very much by retaining with him 2000 horse and a large body of infantry, belonging to the States." *Domestic Calender*, William and Mary, Vol. I, p. 80. Compare also pp. 101, 142.

³ Waldeck to William, Mar. 5, 1689. "M. l'Electeur de Brandebourg a tant pressé M. le General Schoning que contre tout raison et sans estre en estat de rien faire il fait la marche dans la pays de Cologne avec 4000 hommes." See too, Waldeck to William Feb. 25, 1689. Both in Müller.

the Netherlands he sought loans, exemption from customs, and prompt payment of obligations. He urged that they store supplies for the support of such of their troops as might come into his lands, and under his orders. He asked them to pay at once, instead of in three months, for forage purchased from his subjects in Cleves. But one thing is noticeable. Nowhere in these first critical months, is there a sign of bargaining as to his main position.

Upon the correspondence, between Waldeck and Fürstenberg's general Bernsau, regarding mutual sparing of Cologne and the Provinces, complaints and explanations were carried on, long after the matter itself had been entirely given up.¹ Its chief interest is the extreme indignation of Frederick toward a negotiation similar to, but much more harmless than his own of December, when an ally was concerned instead of himself. The plan for placing a Brandenburg garrison in Gelders, which Waldeck gladly furthered, was brought to completion in March. Frederick's anxiety over Denmark, and his wish to secure general conferences, at Vienna and the Hague, upon the coming campaign, also became apparent in February and March. Some lesser matters, such as his dissatisfaction that Mary was called to England, are of no great importance.

In reviewing the foregoing, it does not seem either that Frederick lacked independence, or that he had shown any spirit of sacrifice. It is a noticeable feature of his relations both with Orange and the Estates that, after the two treaties of the summer of 1688, Frederick takes the initiative in most of the intercourse. At very few points does the pressure come from the other side. But Frederick is never content. His demands for aid both in defensive and offensive plans were constant, and several of them he carried thru, partly in the

¹ Diest to Frederick, Feb. 8/18, Feb. 11/21, Feb. 18/28, Mar. 1/11, Mar. 8. Frederick to Diest, Feb. 13/23, Feb. 20, Mar. 10/20. Ham to the Estates, Feb. 13/23, Mar. 2, Mar. 10.

face of Waldeck's contrary judgment. As for sacrifice, he and his ministers watched every detail to see that in no way should his lands, or his revenues, contribute anything which could be avoided. Furthermore, while the other allies were, generally speaking, satisfied if the offensive of Louis were broken, or with the usual subsidy agreements, Frederick had many a thought of gains of a more positive and lasting nature. They were not always wise. He doubtless valued his own importance and capacities too highly, and failed correctly to estimate the whole situation. But, without these dreams, his actions would be difficult of explanation.

After Fuchs left William in October, the important intercourse between the two princes ceased for a time. Frederick had, however, several correspondents in England, among them William himself, Schomberg and Bentinck; while the reports of Bonnet continue in their usual voluminous fashion. When news of the landing reached him, he determined to send d'Espense with congratulations,¹ and possibly with some further secret instructions.² But the first mission of traceable importance was that of Spaen.³ He carried Frederick's explanation of the intercourse with France. He was to urge that, since the English affair had prospered, and depended largely on Continental conditions, England should declare war and return, under Schomberg's command, a large part of the army. Also he must seek subsidies. Frederick felt that the English ought easily to agree to them, if shown how much he had done for them, and how much more he could do, if properly supplied. Thus Frederick returns to the demand which had been allowed to slip into the background at the time of the Fuchs-Bentinck meeting. It would not seem to have been mentioned meanwhile. The mission of Fuchs in October con-

¹ Instructions and credentials for d'Espense, Minden, Nov 17/27.

² Ham reports, Nov. 20/30, "Ich verneme van goeden handt dat gem. Heer Graef bij secrete instructie gelast is." H. R. A.

³ His instructions are dated Dec. 29/Jan. 8 and Jan. 1/11.

tains no such suggestion. Nor, in the course of the long negotiations which now follow, did Frederick claim that promises had been made to him. In any case, it was only after the break with France that he could actually expect subsidies.

In the mission of Spaen a great difference in the viewpoints of the two princes first openly appears, tho Waldeck, commenting on Schmettau's instructions, stated the matter more clearly a little later. In William's mind the opposition to Louis was a unified whole, in which the greatest interest of each of the allies was involved, and for participation in which, they should not, *ipso facto*, expect reward from him. Frederick, while he had entered on this plan for his own sake, and because of deep-seated religious and political beliefs, felt that William, thru his aid, had achieved a great personal triumph, that England had been rescued, and that he, Frederick, ought to receive some immediate material advantage. He feared, too, that William might forget the need of the mainland. It was not possible for him to realize that, for William, the English expedition was only a first step in a new struggle. Nor is it surprising that he expected his services to find practical recognition, when one considers the homage he received.¹

In reply to Spaen's mission, troops were promised readily enough. In fact Schomberg, in a very sanguine letter, perhaps intended to keep Frederick in the right path, had already promised the speedy return of 10,000 men.² The time did not, however, seem propitious for granting subsidies, tho the question was not passed off as quickly as Pufendorf seems to imply. The demands continued without interruption, during the com-

¹ Fuchs wrote Frederick, Oct. 16/26, that Dykvelt says, "der Staat nachst Gott sein hogstes vertrauen entzigh und alleine auff E. C. D. gerichtet hette." and "dass der Staat E. C. D. ewig verbunden wehre vor den guthen patriotischen eyffer——" B. St. A.

Schmettau writes, May 1689, that Shrewsbury told him, "Nous reconnoissons fort bien, qu'apres le Roy c'est S. A. E. de Brandenbourg qui nous sauve." B. St. A.

² Dec. 28, 1688. Cavelli, Vol. II, p. 447.

ing months; and William was usually ready to promise to do what he could, and to hold out hopes for the future. Also Schomberg, Dykvelt, and Witsen declared their willingness to aid Spaen, and later Schmettau, to secure subsidies. Spaen, however, remained unsuccessful.

Frederick was not less persistent in his desire for Schomberg's return to the Continent. He was considering the journey to Prussia, and doubtless hoped to leave the feared and respected veteran, in the Rhineland. He wanted not only his service and advice, but also the prestige which would accrue to himself. Perhaps he even thought that Schomberg might retain the troops which he brought back from England.¹ A more special reason may have been the fact that while Waldeck outranked Schöning, Schomberg would probably, according to the arrangements made at Wesel in December, be the commanding officer, if the Dutch and Brandenburg forces formed a single army. And he would be under Frederick's orders. Whether or not William realized this and preferred to keep matters as they were, he refused to enter into the question of Schomberg's return. In any case the excuse, that he needed his services in Ireland, was true enough. Frederick also urged Schomberg himself,² who apparently would have preferred service in Germany. But the decision remained with William.

Some further matters were taken up by Spaen. In particular Frederick hoped to convince William of his steadfastness, and to secure his influence for the protection of Cleves, and other undertakings. The best method of securing the support of Denmark, without offending Sweden, became the subject of much discussion after the beginning of February.

¹ Instructions for Spaen, Jan. 8. He is to urge upon Orange "die Englische nation nicht allein zu eine Kriegs Declaration wieder Frankreich bestens zu disponieren sondern auch eine erklecklichen theil Ihre aus diesen Provincien nach England mitgenommenen trouppen unter des Marschales de Schomberg commando wieder zuruck anher zusen-den." B. St. A.

² Frederick to Schomberg, Jan. 3, 1689. Concept in B. St. A.

The instructions of Schmettau contain the same demands, tho more earnestly expressed. Great emphasis is placed upon Frederick's services,¹ and his need of subsidies² and of Schomberg. He was, besides, to seek the speedy consummation of an alliance, between England, Brandenburg, and the Netherlands, guaranteeing Frederick complete reimbursement for all damages. The above mentioned propositions in regard to the Stadtholdership, and the relations with Denmark, form considerable portions of his instructions. As to subsidies for Denmark, he was to move very cautiously until Brandenburg had been provided for. With certain of these points, and their statement, Waldeck expressed disapproval. He did not believe that the time had come to discuss an alliance, or that such an alliance should contain special guarantee for Brandenburg. Especially, he objected that Frederick seemed to demand aid, because of what he had done for Orange, when as a matter of fact he had acted for his own interest.³ This last point Frederick was forced in part to admit. The question of the Stadtholdership does not seem to have been mentioned to Waldeck, nor does it enter into Schmettau's formal memorial on the points of his instruction.⁴

As far as can be judged, William's attitude was much the same as that of Waldeck. He was much interested in the

¹ "Es wehre—bekandt—wie gerne und willig wir mit underlassungen der trouppen wie auch mit unserem bey Braunschweig-Zelle und Hessen-Cassel angewandten officiis alles was in unserem vermögen gewesen dazur contribuiert."

² "Das furnembste aber worauf er seine gedanken und bemühungen zu richten ist dass wir einige geld subsidien von England erhalten."

³ Schmettau writes, from the Hague, Mar. 14/24, that Waldeck said, "Muste man die principien allerzeit nehmen, dass jeder von der guten Parthey umb seines eignen interesse willen und nicht andern zugefallen in den Krieg gegen Frankreich trette—Muste man also einander die merita nicht aufrechnen oder grosse obligation, avantagen, und subsidien von einander deshalb protendiren."

⁴ Schmettau to Frederick, May 6.

northern question, because it needed attention. He was not particularly interested in Frederick's demands for himself, for he felt sure where Brandenburg's interest lay, and that there was no present danger of an adjustment with France. It is not likely that the question of gratitude or ingratitude would have greatly influenced him.¹ His own position and responsibilities were too difficult. But there is no reason to suppose that he would have considered these questions to be involved. In Frederick, as an individual, he very likely had never had any large measure of confidence. His attitude grows less and less appreciative as Frederick becomes more and more independent, and useless to the plans of the allies.²

Besides the direct intercourse with Orange and the Provinces, the tendency and influence of Frederick's other relations call for some notice. They were all largely dependent upon the position which he was ready to take in the central problem of the year. Opinion has varied greatly as to the motives, the course, and the results of his actions. What he might have accomplished, if he had centered all his attention on one point, is of no great importance. He felt, wisely or unwisely, that while supporting the opposition to France, he must also serve his special dynastic aims, and various immediate interests of his territories. And his policy, if judged at all, must be judged from the point of view of his success in combining all his varied aims. But, as far as the central feature of the first months is concerned, the simple essential fact is that Frederick accepted the plan of 1688. Certainly he need not be confined to a single motive. The desire to appear possessed of a German patriotism played a part. How far Frederick would deliberately have sacrificed any of his own interests in the interest of Germany does not, however, appear. There is no doubt of his

¹ Compare Droysen on William's ingratitude.

² Krämer, *Archives—de la maison d'Orange-Nassau*, and van der Heim, "*Archief v. den Raadpensionarius A. Heinsius*," have a great many such complaints.

anxiety for Protestantism. Still, as the aim was always to keep the struggle entirely within political lines, this can hardly be said to come to the front. The plain logic of the facts seems to be that the Elector and his advisers saw that Brandenburg's interest lay in the support of the plan of 1688. There is nothing to give color to the idea that any outside question, taken alone, would, or should, have swayed him. As a matter of fact, however, the interests of Protestantism, of Germany, and of Brandenburg all centered about the struggle with France, and Frederick's choice was much lightened thereby.

Having made his decision, Frederick showed his willingness to act accordingly. And this willingness was a contribution of the first importance. Still it was a contribution differing in quantity, rather than quality, from that of the other North German princes. It differed because he was Elector of Brandenburg, because his lands lay directly in the path of France, because he looked upon himself and his house as the natural successor of William on the Continent. But he was not the only person who realized the situation, and had a vital interest in developments. Nor did he possess the predominance of the coming Prussia. He was still, very largely, one among his equals,—his jealous equals, all of whom were able to read the fairly obvious signs of the times, and to act accordingly. There is no indication that the basic position of Hesse-Cassel, of Celle, or of Hanover, was due to his persuasion. But it was a time when everyone, not excepting Frederick, felt in greater or less degree inclined to wait the course of events, to see where his neighbor would stand. Here Frederick's desire to further the cause played no unimportant part. It encouraged the other powers to action, which, in turn, encouraged him.

In this connection the relations with Hesse-Cassel are worthy of mention. Pufendorf says that, when the Landgrave came to Berlin, Frederick cautiously laid the matter before him, and prepared the way for the later propositions of

Orange.¹ There is little doubt that this is the course which Frederick proposed to himself. It is possible, tho hardly probable, that he was left to believe that he had carried it thru. The Landgrave met him unexpectedly, at Fürstenwalde, on July 27. On August 1, Görtz signed at Berlin a memoir on the conditions, prepared by Bentinck, for the transfer of troops to the Provinces.² As Bentinck was far from Berlin, even five days is too brief an interval to allow for Pufendorf's story. In any case the Landgrave was already informed of the situation by Bentinck; and, very likely, had some still earlier knowledge, as Görtz had been the secret agent of Orange since May. It may well be that the meeting with his minister was fully as important as that with Frederick, in completing the agreement with William. Surely the Landgrave and Görtz were just as active, in their degree, as Frederick and his advisers in theirs. They doubtless met at Berlin, of their own motion, to feel the situation there. Encouragement to both Elector and Landgrave resulted. The direct outcome was the treaty between Brandenburg and Hesse-Cassel. Indirectly it may have facilitated the speedy acceptance of Bentinck's propositions by each of them.³

On Frederick's representations to the Emperor, Pufendorf also places considerable emphasis. The agitation of the Catholic party falls, somewhat, into two periods, one before, the other after, the flight of James. Surely Frederick did what he could on both occasions. But, naturally enough, he followed William both in time and in argument. Nor is it likely that his representations had great importance, compared with those of the Pope, the opinions of theologians, the direct communica-

¹ De rebus Frederici, III, Lib. I, § 68.

² Original in H. R. A.

³ As a matter of fact it is probable that Pufendorf based his account upon a memoir, preserved among papers at Berlin which he certainly used, (B. St. A. Rep. XI, Nr. 73, Conv. 10, F.), in which Fuchs suggests that the Landgrave might be approached by just the steps mentioned in the "Res gestae" as actually occurring.

tions of Orange, the fact that James fled to France, and the hold which Leopold knew he possessed, over Frederick, thru the "Recess" of 1686.

Still, tho William was not, and could not be, dependent on Frederick even in his German negotiations, he recognized his possible importance. Repeatedly he asked him to use his influence with Saxony, with Brunswick, and above all with Münster. In fact, tho Bentinck claimed to feel assured of Celle, he was very urgent that Fuchs also see Bernstoff, the chief minister of the Duke, and explain the position of Brandenburg. Later Frederick was prompt to recognize William as king, and in urging that no agents of James be received at Regensburg or Vienna. Surely Frederick was not in a position, either politically or personally, to lead William or to guide his diplomacy. Nor would his father have been. Still it does not seem that he fell into the position of a mere supporter of William in Germany. In his complaint that the Elector and his ministers "kamen in die Lage, die oranischen Unterhandlungen zu unterstützen statt zu leiten," Droysen forgets William, his character, and his responsibilities. He forgets that it was William, not Brandenburg, who could offer inducements, and who alone could utter the "nunc aut numquam." He fails to see, what the men of the time saw, that, hampered by a Brandenburg bent on leading, the expedition of 1688 could probably never have occurred; and that Frederick had more to gain as a valuable ally than in a futile attempt to lead. And it may be added that the Elector had no intention of being other than at least an equal with William, especially in Germany. He rapidly shows independence, tho he found, naturally enough, that the rest of Europe was more than a mere set of puppets.

But, especially, Droysen forgets, for the moment, that this was not the whole story. Frederick and his ministers have their own part to play in the organization of German resistance to France. The plan of 1688 was far reaching, and everything seemed to depend upon the success of the English ex-

pedition. But the time for building a general alliance had not arrived, and the whole structure was a fabric of separate alliances. Orange assured himself of the position of the German courts, and drew a portion of their troops into the service of the Netherlands. This was important, but only a portion of the task. The organization among the German princes fell to other hands; and here Frederick and his ministers played a large and active part. The reason is to be found in the comparative importance of his power, the previous alliance with France, and present readiness to turn to a new line of policy. It is not to be found in willingness on his part to sacrifice for a common cause, in a greater insight or a less. Frederick and his advisers were convinced. They had chosen their part in the struggle, and acted accordingly, picking the way as carefully as possible, but not so carefully as to injure the cause. They did not desire to hasten their own break with France, and could not hope directly to hasten the offensive of the allies. Probably, however, this turned out for the best. And it is hard to say what further steps should have been taken, by the North German princes, in these first months.

One great difficulty with historical results is the practical impossibility of properly estimating the influence of the personal elements. Still the real question should be whether Frederick did what he could do, not whether he did ideally well. He was surely not a man of exceptional ability, and he was in a very difficult position. He had good advisers and used them, tho there can be no doubt that the decision remained with him. The plain fact is that he accomplished the immediate task left him by his father; and, in all probability as thoroughly as the latter could have done. When all is said, it may be doubted whether his voice, at this time, was not as steady, if less violent, than his father's would have been. He held back at times, but at critical points he acted; and, when he acted, it was for the cause, or at least for Brandenburg in ways which he did not consider harmful to the cause. Brandenburg's position was difficult, especially because, while not

always strong enough to act as a great power, she was strong enough to have the ambition to do so. She had reached a point in her development, where some temporary sacrifices were occasionally necessary, if she were to keep her position, and be ready for future advance. No one will be prepared to maintain that the policies, either of Frederick William or of Frederick III, were always the wisest. Brandenburg, however, could afford to wait, and would probably in any case have had to wait. Europe could not.

Neither of the two Electors were men of real singleness of purpose. The result has been that commentators have tended to place their emphasis on this plan, or that motive, and have, in so far, failed. As to motive, Frederick was fortunate in being faced by a situation where the cause of Protestantism, of Europe, of Germany, and of Brandenburg, all called for opposition to Louis. Thus he could hardly do otherwise than believe in the plan of 1688. There is no doubt of his intentions, of his activity, or of his importance. It is possible that he might have furthered the struggle with France by a change of policy in one place; or have advanced the more special interests of Brandenburg by a different attitude in another. But he did not consider that he could afford to lose sight of either. And, in this first year, he played his part well. It would be hard to show where he could have done distinctly better. But the role he chose was that for which his person, and his position, was fitted. It was that of a watchful man of affairs, not that of a great hero, or of an unscrupulous intriguer. He was not a helpless dependent. He was not the soul of the struggle against France. He was the Elector of Brandenburg, the Duke of Prussia, and of Cleves, with an inevitable place in the last great struggle of the seventeenth century.

LEBENS LAUF.

Am 12. Juni 1883 bin ich, Harold Lee King, Sohn des Universität Professors, Henry Churchill King, und seiner Ehefrau, in Brecksville, Ohio, geboren.

Nach meinen ersten Schuljahren studierte ich in Oberlin, Ohio, 1901-1903, 1904-1905, 1907-1908, und in Pasadena, California, 1903-1904. Auf dem Oberlin College habe ich mir den Grad A. B. in 1905, und den Grad A. M. in 1908 erworben. Auf der Harvard Universität 1908-1910 und der Universität Freiburg 1912-1914 habe ich das Studium fortgesetzt. Als „Associate Professor of History“ habe ich 1910-1911 an dem Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont, und 1911-1912 an dem Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colorado, dociert.

